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SAGC

10 JUN 2020

Mr. Henry Kerner
U.S. Office of Special Counsel
1730 M Street, N.W. Suite 300
Washington, D.C. 20310-0101

SUBJECT: Whistleblower Investigation -
Alleged violations of law, rule, or
regulation, gross mismanagement, and a
substantial and specific danger to public
safety involving Department of the Army,
1st Personnel Command, Washington-
Moscow Direct Communication Link
(DCL), Detrick Earth Station, Fort Detrick,
Maryland (DI-17-2168)

Dear Mr. Kerner:

In accordance with Title 5, United States Code, Sections 1213(c) and (d), the enclosed summary and report is submitted in response to your referral of information requesting an investigation of allegations and a report of findings in the above referenced case.

The Secretary of the Army (SA) has delegated to me in writing his authority, as Agency head, to review, sign, and submit to you the statutorily required report.

The Department of the Army (DA) will provide two versions of its report. The first version of the report contains the names and duty titles of civilian employees of the DA. This first version is for your official use only, as specified in 5 U.S.C. §1213(e). We understand that, as required by law, you will provide a copy of this first version of the report to the Whistleblower, the President of the United States, and the Senate and House Armed Services Committees for their review. Other releases of the first version of the report may result in violations of the Privacy Act¹ and breaches of personal privacy interests.

The second version of the report has been constructed to eliminate references to privacy protected information and is suitable for release to all others. We request that only the second version of the report be made available on your website, in your public library, or in any other forum in which it will be accessible to persons not expressly entitled by law to a copy of the report.

¹ The Privacy Act of 1974, Title 5, United States Code, Section 552a.

The Department of the Army takes very seriously its responsibility to address, in a timely and thorough fashion, matters referred by the Office of Special Counsel (OSC). In this case, the OSC allegations referred to the Secretary of Defense were forwarded to the Department of the Army for investigation as the allegations involved actions concerning an Army activity. The Army conducted a thorough and comprehensive investigation pursuant to the Army Regulation 15-6, *Procedures for Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers*, in response to the OSC's referred allegations submitted by the Whistleblower, [REDACTED], an Army civilian language specialist. Those allegations asserted that officials identified by OSC as being at the Department of the Army, 1st Personnel Command,² Washington-Moscow Direct Communication Link (DCL), Detrick Earth Station, Fort Detrick, Maryland, had engaged in conduct that may constitute violations of law, rule, or regulation, gross mismanagement, and a substantial and specific danger to public safety. Those four OSC referred allegations centered around events that which reflected wrongdoing that occurred when in 2015, the Detrick Earth Station and the Gateway Telecommunications Center were consolidated and became a remotely operated facility.

Based on the testimonial and documentary evidence gathered by the Investigating Officer, the Investigating Officer found the following: (1) Allegation 1 was *substantiated* - Despite the requirement for a Configuration Control Board (CCB) in the 2008 Information Assurance Plan for the C-Band Satellite Transmit and Receive Systems Direct Communications Link Earth Station (Information Assurance Plan), the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) has not established a CCB for the management of the Detrick Earth Station; (2) Allegation 2 was *substantiated* - Since the 2015 reorganization and consolidation of Detrick Earth Station, there has not been full review of the Information Assurance Plan under the Risk Management Framework established in 2014; (3) Allegation 3 was *unsubstantiated* - Security and operational deficiencies attributable to remote operations persist at the Detrick Earth Station, including poor security monitoring leaving the facility vulnerable; and, (4) Allegation 4 was *unsubstantiated* - The lack of a fire suppression system required by the Information Assurance Plan and a lack of a 24/7 personnel presence has led to security and operational deficiencies.

The Army appreciates the Whistleblower's action in bringing the above matters to the Army's attention to be addressed. As a result of a confluence of a series of events brought about by Institutional, organizational, and personnel changes, the substantiated concerns were overlooked and the necessary processes to ensure a more timely completion of the required tasks did not occur.

² The OSC referral correspondence referenced that the allegations involved the 1st Personnel Command, Washington-Moscow Direct Communication Link (DCL), Detrick Earth Station, Fort Detrick, Maryland. The reference to th 1st Personnel Command is incorrect. The DCL DES is subordinate to the U.S. Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER) and its chain of subordinate units which report through the Network Enterprise Technology Command (NETCOM), the 7th Signal Command (Theater), the 21st Signal Brigade, to the 302d Signal Battalion.

Upon her approval of the Report of Investigation, the Approving Authority took swift and immediate action by directing the initiation of appropriate corrective actions to address the Investigating Officer's findings and recommendations. As a result, to date, the corrective actions taken by DCL DES officials have implemented the processes that will lead to the re-establishment and fully engaged DCL Configuration Control Board (addressing substantiated Allegation 1) and furthering the process for completing the approval process of the Information Assurance Plan under the Risk Management Framework (addressing substantiated Allegation 2).


Additionally, as the implementation of the corrective actions for Allegations 1 and 2 necessarily require participation by the Army's Chief Information Officer/G-6 Office, I will forward this Report to the CIO/G-6 to take appropriate assistive and follow up actions.

In my role as the Designated Official to review and forward the Army's Report to OSC on behalf of the Secretary of the Army, I have completed my review and am forwarding to you the Army's Report on the subject OSC referred allegations.

I am satisfied that the IO's conclusions and implementation of the associated recommendations constitute an appropriate outcome in this matter. Accordingly, the Army has made no referral of alleged criminal violation to the Attorney General pursuant to Title 5, United States Code, § 1213(d)(5)(d).

This report, with enclosures, is submitted in satisfaction of my responsibilities under Title 5, United States Code, Sections 1213 (c) and (d). Please direct any further questions you may have concerning this matter to Ms. [REDACTED], at 703-[REDACTED].

Sincerely,



E. Casey Wardynski

SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

I. INFORMATION INITIATING THE INVESTIGATION

By correspondence dated July 2, 2019, the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) forwarded to the Secretary of Defense, Dr. Mark Esper, allegations from a Whistleblower, [REDACTED], an Army civilian language specialist, that officials at the activity OSC identified as being at Department of the Army, 1st Personnel Command,³ Washington-Moscow Direct Communication Link (DCL), Detrick Earth Station, Fort Detrick, Maryland, had engaged in conduct that may constitute violations of law, rule, or regulation, gross mismanagement, and a substantial and specific danger to public safety. The OSC concluded that there was a substantial likelihood that the information provided to the OSC discloses a violation of law, rule, or regulation; gross mismanagement; and a substantial and specific danger to public safety.

Specifically, the Whistleblower alleged that in 2015, when the Detrick Earth Station and the Gateway Telecommunications Center were consolidated and became a remotely operated facility, the following wrongful actions took place:

(1) Despite the requirement for a Configuration Control Board (CCB) in the 2008 Information Assurance Plan for the C-Band Satellite Transmit and Receive Systems Direct Communications Link Earth Station (Information Assurance Plan), the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) has not established a CCB for the management of the Detrick Earth Station;

(2) Since the 2015 reorganization and consolidation of Detrick Earth Station there has not been full review of the Information Assurance Plan under the Risk Management Framework established in 2014;

(3) Security and operational deficiencies attributable to remote operations persist at the Detrick Earth Station, including poor security monitoring leaving the facility vulnerable; and,

(4) The lack of a fire suppression system required by the Information Assurance Plan and a lack of a 24/7 personnel presence has led to security and operational deficiencies.

³ The OSC referral correspondence referenced that the allegations involved the 1st Personnel Command, Washington-Moscow Direct Communication Link (DCL), Detrick Earth Station, Fort Detrick, Maryland. The reference to the 1st Personnel Command is incorrect. The DCL DES is subordinate to the U.S. Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER) and its chain of subordinate units which report through the Network Enterprise Technology Command (NETCOM), the 7th Signal Command (Theater), the 21st Signal Brigade, to the 302d Signal Battalion.

II. CONDUCT OF THE INVESTIGATION

The Secretary of Defense forwarded to the Secretary of the Army for investigation and appropriate action the OSC's transmittal concerning the allegations of alleged wrongdoing by officials that OSC identified as being at Army's 1st Personnel Command⁴, Washington-Moscow Direct Communication Link (DCL), Detrick Earth Station (DES), Fort Detrick, Maryland.

Pursuant to coordination efforts between the correspondence offices for the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Army, this OSC referral was transmitted to the Army on July 25, 2019. In turn, the Office of the Secretary of the Army forwarded this OSC referral to the Office of the Army General Counsel for further processing. On August 6, 2019, this referral was forwarded by the Office of the Army General Counsel to the Chief Information Officer CIO/G-6, Lieutenant General (LTG) Bruce Crawford, for appropriate action, including the initiation of an investigation into the allegations and appointment of an Investigating Officer (IO) pursuant to Army Regulation (AR) 15-6, *Procedures for Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers*, and taking appropriate corrective actions.

The CIO/G-6 began his efforts by directing the United States Army Network Enterprise Command (NETCOM) to initiate an AR 15-6 investigation by designating an Investigation Officer (IO). On August 15, 2019, the NETCOM Chief of Staff, Colonel (COL) [REDACTED], appointed Ms. [REDACTED], United States Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER), Fort Belvoir, Virginia, as the IO. The IO has more than 33 years of active duty and civil service experience with the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of the Army (DA). Her area of expertise is Information Technology (IT) to include strategic telecommunications support at facilities similar to the DES. She has served as the Chief, Department of Defense Information Network (DODIN) Operations, G35 Future Operations, Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER) for the past 2 years.

On August 16, 2019, in order to better align with the organization with responsibility over the subject matter addressed in the OSC allegations, this case was subsequently referred by the Principal Deputy General Counsel to LTG Stephen Fogarty, the Commander, U.S. Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER) to continue the AR 15-6 process and the already initiated investigation that had previously been commenced by LTG Crawford. The IO began interviewing witnesses and gathering relevant documents. However, logistics issues arose from the beginning, as the IO had to deal with multiple interviews that had to be coordinated at

⁴ Again, to reiterate the clarification provided in footnote 2, the OSC referral correspondence referenced that the allegations involved the 1st Personnel Command, Washington-Moscow Direct Communication Link (DCL), Detrick Earth Station, Fort Detrick, Maryland. The reference to the 1st Personnel Command is incorrect. The DCL DES is subordinate to the U.S. Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER) and its chain of subordinate units which report through the Network Enterprise Technology Command (NETCOM), the 7th Signal Command (Theater), the 21st Signal Brigade, to the 302d Signal Battalion.

multiple locations to include Fort Detrick, Maryland, as well as a roughly two-hour (one-way) commute to and from her location at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, the ARCYBER Headquarters.

To prepare for conducting the AR 15-6 investigation, the IO reviewed the July 2, 2019 correspondence from the OSC which included the referred allegations and its attachments for background information that included documents reflecting prior allegations that the Whistleblower, [REDACTED], had made to both ARCYBER and to OSC. The OSC correspondence and a footnote in the OSC referral correspondence detailed that “[REDACTED] reported his concerns regarding the management and operation of the DES to the Army in 2015 resulting in an investigation. OSC informally requested the Army provide additional information on the status of [REDACTED] concerns and received updated information in 2018. The Army’s responses to those inquiries dated December 17, 2015, April 20, 2016 and January 18, 2018” were enclosed in OSC’s July 2, 2019 correspondence. The IO reviewed the case files of those Army internal reviews for background information. As a result of her review of those prior Army efforts which dealt with 11 allegations, the IO concluded that the Whistleblower’s chain of command had addressed seven of those allegations and the remaining four became the allegations which were the subject of the July 2, 2019 OSC referral.

The IO began her investigation with an office visit to the 21st Signal Brigade Headquarters at Fort Detrick, Maryland, and met with Mr. [REDACTED], Civilian Deputy to the Commander/Chief Information Officer, 21st Signal Brigade, Fort Detrick, Maryland. Mr. [REDACTED] provided an overview of the mission and the organization of the DES and provided a recommended list of personnel to interview for the investigation.

The IO conducted interviews with and obtained sworn statements from the following witnesses:

(1) Mr. [REDACTED], Civilian Executive Officer, U.S. Army Signal Activity-Fort Detrick, Maryland;

(2) The Whistleblower, Mr. [REDACTED], Linguist, U.S. Army Signal Activity-Fort Detrick, Maryland;

(3) Mr. [REDACTED], Defense Information System Agency (DISA IE), Director/Chief, Senior National Leadership Communications Division, Fort Meade, Maryland;

(4) Mr. [REDACTED], Satellite Terminal Systems PdM Wideband Enterprise Satellite Systems (WESS), Program Executive Office – Electronic Information System (PEO-EIS), Fort Belvoir, Virginia;

(5) Mr. [REDACTED], Telecommunications Specialist, U.S. Army Signal Activity-Fort Detrick, Maryland; and,

(6) COL [REDACTED], Director, Network & Space Integration, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Chief Information Office (HQDA CIO/G-6).

Gathering the relevant evidence occurred between August and September 2019. During September 3-26, 2019, the IO drafted her Report of Investigation (ROI) and sent it to her legal counsel for his assistance and review. On or about October 21, 2019, the NETCOM Command legal office returned the draft findings and recommendations to the legal advisor for the IO and requested further information. On October 29, 2019, the NETCOM legal review was completed. In turn, on October 30, 2019, the NETCOM legal office forwarded the draft ROI and its attachments to the Army OGC for its review and comments. The draft AR 15-6 ROI was staffed within OGC for its completeness. On November 26, 2019, the IO was provided very detailed comments regarding the need to expand her efforts and gather additional facts and interview statements to ensure all relevant evidence had been tracked. A new legal advisor had to be assigned to the IO which delayed his ability to assist the IO until he had become familiar with the prior investigative effort and the background for the allegations. The IO completed the process of addressing the issues forwarded to her by OGC, the ROI was completed, and was forwarded to the Approving Official for her review and approval.

COL [REDACTED], the former Chief of Staff and Appointing Authority for the subject AR 15-6 retired. As a result, there was a change to the NETCOM leadership at the end of March 2020, and COL [REDACTED] was replaced by the new Chief of Staff, COL [REDACTED]. COL [REDACTED] became the Approving Authority for the AR 15-6 Report of Investigation including the IO's recommendations. She approved the Report of Investigation on March 24, 2020. On March 26, 2020, the Approving Authority directed that the Commander, 21st Signal Brigade, implement and complete the IO's recommendations. In the meantime, the AR 15-6 report was forwarded to the Army OGC for use in drafting the final Army narrative report for its submission to the OSC.

However, completing the Army's narrative report was difficult as there were significant disruptions in being able to prepare and finalize the Army's report as a result of the Coronavirus-19 (COVID-19) pandemic and the sudden requirement to telework. This unforeseen situation required Army personnel at all levels who were involved in finalizing the Army's report to face unprecedented logistical digital/electronic medium challenges brought on by having to perform work for the first time in a telework situation rather than working from the office environment due to the safety and health reasons related to the COVID-19 pandemic. Since mid-March 2020, as has occurred in the vast majority of the federal workplaces, teleworking was instituted across the federal workforce on a massive scale and for the first time at many agencies and worksites. The Department of Defense (DoD) is one of those agencies where about 95 percent or more of the DoD workplaces had not been teleworking prior to the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak.

Additionally, delays were encountered in being able to coordinate with Army personnel whose ability to work on the Army's report was hampered by being diverted to work on COVID-19 related high priority matters, many of which presented themselves as novel/first impression and oftentimes complex actions. The final Army report addressing the referred OSC allegations was completed and its findings, conclusions, recommendations, and final corrective actions are summarized below.

III. ORGANIZATIONAL ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

In order to properly assess the merits of the Whistleblower's allegations that revolve around the shortcomings he asserts occurred as a result of the 2015 consolidation action between the Detrick Earth Station and the Gateway Telecommunications Center when it became a remotely operated facility, it is important to know the backdrop of the founding and mission of the Detrick Earth Station.

Within the Department of Defense (DoD), the lead DoD Official for its Cyber and Information Security is the DoD Chief Information Officer (CIO). Among his/her responsibilities, the DoD CIO performs the following functions: monitors, evaluates, and provides advice to the Secretary of Defense regarding all DoD cybersecurity activities and oversees implementation of DoDI 8500.01, *Department of Defense Instruction (DODI), Cybersecurity, Number 8500.01*; develops and establishes DoD cybersecurity policy and guidance. (TAB S).

Under the authority, direction, and control of the DoD CIO, the Director, Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) develops, implements, and, in coordination with Commander, U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), manages cybersecurity for the Defense Information Systems Network.

The Army's Headquarters (HQDA) level lead organization tasked with oversight responsibility for Army's Cyber and Network missions is the Chief Information Officer/G-6. The CIO/G-6 has line command to the Department of Defense's Defense Information System Agency (DISA). (TAB O).

The Detrick Earth Station is subordinate to the U.S. Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER) and its chain of subordinate units which report through the Network Enterprise Technology Command (NETCOM), the 7th Signal Command (Theater), the 21st Signal Brigade, to the 302d Signal Battalion. The primary mission of these organizations is to operate and maintain the assigned Department of Defense Information Network systems and capabilities for the Army.

Established in 1974, the Fort Detrick Direct Communication Link (DCL) earth terminal was installed at Fort Detrick, Maryland, for use by the U.S. Army. It supports communications with the former Soviet Union countries located in three different countries. Each DCL terminal antenna is located in the antenna field next to the Earth Terminal Complex (ETC) building 1650

on Fort Detrick. The antenna field is secured by fencing. The entire DCL is operated within a physical controlled zone (PCZ) that provides all necessary physical protection commensurate with the classification level at which the DCL is being utilized. Access is controlled to the area of the location of the equipment, and a perimeter is established to restrict access.

The Commander, U. S. Army Signal Activity – Detrick, 302d Signal Battalion, 21st Signal Brigade, is responsible for operating and maintaining the DCL at the Detrick Earth Station (DES). (TAB A). In 2015, the day to day operations of the DCL was remoted across the street from the ETC building to the Gateway Telecommunications Center (GTC) building 1668. The DCL, DES is monitored 24/7 from the GTC to assure the physical security of the external and internal perimeter of the DES. (TAB F).

Within the above responsibilities, and consistent with its Lead Military Department responsibilities assigned by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Director, Communications, Command and Control (C3) (TAB I), the establishment and the governance of the Configuration Control Board was historically chartered with the responsibilities overseen by DISA and HQDA's CIO/G-6. This action, in effect gave the Army the Executive Agent responsibility over the Direct Communications Link (DCL). Further, historically, the DCL Configuration Control Board (CCB) has been chaired by the Office of the U.S. Army Chief Information Officer/G-6. The CCB is chartered to successfully identify engineering plans, configuration standards and designs, and implementations that support operational requirements for the DCL. The CCB works to ensure interoperability and synchronization between all stakeholders (DISA, Moscow Link (MOLINK), State Department, White House, Program Manager Defense Communications and Army Transmission Systems (PM DCATS), DoD CIO, and others).

The DCL CCB assigns to member organizations the responsibilities for establishing and maintaining of technical and functional baselines for the system. The DCL CCB is meant to operate in an integrated and disciplined manner to provide a structured and streamlined control process for managing the assigned products and services throughout their intended life cycle. Life cycle configuration management through the CCB ensures that all changes are visible, that any potential safety, security and operational impacts are properly addressed, and that technical and programmatic direction across the DCL system's products, services and interfaces are consistent.

IV. RULES AND REGULATIONS

A. Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC); UFC 1-200-0t, *DOD Building Code (General Building Requirements)*, 20 June 2016 (TAB D).

B. Department of Defense Instruction (DODI), *Cybersecurity, Number 8500.01*, March 14, 2014. (TAB O). DoDI 8500.01 outlines the DoD policy for Cybersecurity, which among other matters, governs DoD's Information Technology (IT) and information in electronic form.

Paragraph 3.a. states the DoD policy for Risk Management and states the following:

3.a. Risk Management

- (1) DoD will implement a multi-tiered cybersecurity risk management process to protect U.S. interests, DoD operational capabilities, and DoD individuals, organizations, and assets from the DoD Information Enterprise level, through the DoD Component level, down to the IS level as described in National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication (SP) 800-39 (Reference (o)) and Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS) Policy (CNSSP) 22...
- (2) Risks associated with vulnerabilities inherent in IT, global sourcing and distribution, and adversary threats to DoD use of cyberspace must be considered in DoD employment of capabilities to achieve objectives in military, intelligence, and business operations.
- (3) All DoD IT will be assigned to, and governed by, a DoD Component cybersecurity program that manages risk commensurate with the importance of supported missions and the value of potentially affected information or assets. DoD CIO.

DoDI 8500.01, Enclosure 2 also defines the roles and responsibilities of the DoD CIO and DISA.

C. Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 8510.01, *Risk Management Framework (RMF) for DOD Information Technology (IT)*, March 12, 2014. (TAB P). DoDI 8510.01 provides the framework policies and guidance concerning all of DoD's Information Technology (IT) that receive, process, store, display, or transmit DoD information. Additionally, in paragraph 3, it states that it is DoD policy to perform the following responsibilities:

- a. The DoD will establish and use an integrated enterprise-wide decision structure for cybersecurity risk management (the RMF) that includes and integrates DoD mission areas (MAs) pursuant to DoDD 8115.01 (Reference (m)) and the governance process prescribed in this instruction.
- b. The cybersecurity requirements for DoD information technologies will be managed through the RMF... (TAB P).

DoDI 8510.01, Enclosure 2, Responsibilities, also defines the roles of the DoD CIO and the Director, DISA:

1. DoD CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER (DoD CIO). The DoD CIO:
 - a. Oversees implementation of this instruction, directs and oversees the cybersecurity risk management of DoD IT, distributes RMF information standards and sharing requirements, and manages the transition from the DIACAP to the RMF.
 - b. In coordination with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Developmental Test and Evaluation (DASD(DT&E)) and the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), ensures developmental and OT&E activities and findings are integrated into the RMF.
2. DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS AGENCY (DISA). Under the authority, direction, and control of the DoD CIO and in addition to the responsibilities in paragraph 7 of this enclosure, the Director, DISA:
 - a. Ensures control correlation identifiers (CCIs), security requirements guides (SRGs), and security technical implementation guides (STIGs) developed by DISA are consistent with security controls and assessment procedures used by the DoD.
 - b. Develops and provides RMF training and awareness products and a distributive training capability to support the DoD Components in accordance with Reference (h) and DoDD 8140.01 (Reference (o)); posts the training materials on the IA Support Environment Website (<http://iase.disa.mil>).
 - c. Identifies or develops and provides DoD Enterprise RMF management tools.

DoDI 8510.01, Enclosure 6 details the procedures for Risk Management of Information Systems (IS) and describes “the DoD process for identifying, implementing, assessing, and managing cybersecurity capabilities and services, expressed as security controls, and authorizing the operation of IS.” At paragraph 1.d., it explains the requirement for all IS to have a Security Plan:

- d. Security Plan. DoD IS and PIT systems must have a security plan that provides an overview of the security requirements for the system and describes the security controls in place or planned for meeting those requirements. The security plan should include implementation status, responsible entities, resources, and estimated completion dates. Security plans may also include, but are not limited to, a compiled list of system characteristics or qualities required for system registration, key security-related documents such as a risk assessment, privacy impact assessment, system interconnection agreements, contingency plan, security configurations, configuration management plan, and incident response plan.
(TAB P).

In accordance with DoDI 8510.01, Risk Management Framework (RMF) for DoD Information Technology (IT), all DoD information technology systems that receive, process,

store, display, or transmit DoD information are governed by the Risk Management Framework to safeguard cybersecurity. As such, each system owner must gain an Authorization to Operate (ATO) by the Authorizing Official (AO). *The AO for the DCL is the DISA Risk Management Executive/Authorizing Official.* (TAB V).⁵

Additionally, DoDI 8510.01, Enclosure 6 not only provides for the procedures for developing a Risk Management Framework but it also assigns the responsibility to oversee this effort to the Authorizing Official. Generally, the Authorizing Official's role in this authorization process is defined as the official in a senior leadership position who is both responsible and accountable for a system. The official also accepts the system-related security risks that may impact organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation.

Through the RMF, each system's components and facilities detail the controls to ensure cybersecurity and physical security is enforced. These controls inform the Authorizing Official's decision to approve the Approval to Operate (ATO). Adjustments or changes to these controls must be consistent with the AO's approval.

D. Army Regulation (AR) 25-1, the Army Information Technology, dated 15 July 2019. AR 25-1, paragraph 1-1 states that it "establishes policies and assigns responsibilities for information management (IM), data management, and Information Technology (IT), to include platform IT (PIT) and operational technology. It provides policy for the planning, budgeting, governance, acquisition, and management of Army IT, personnel, equipment, funds, IT resources and supporting infrastructure, and services. Army organizations must adhere to basic principles throughout the information resource management (IRM) process."

V. BACKGROUND OF THE EVIDENCE

Mr. [REDACTED] Civilian Deputy to the Commander/Chief Information Officer, 21st Signal Brigade, provided the IO with the following overview of the DES mission as well as a slide identifying the authorized and on hand personnel at the U.S. Army Signal Activity – Detrick. (TAB A – Testimony of [REDACTED]). Additional background for the DES mission follows.

The Commander, U. S. Army Signal Activity – Detrick, 302d Signal Battalion, 21st Signal Brigade, is responsible for operating and maintaining the DCL at the Detrick Earth Station (DES). The assigned personnel are task organized to support the various missions. [REDACTED], the Whistleblower, is assigned to the U.S. Army Signal Activity.

⁵ The AO designation for the DCL did not occur until after the Investigating Officer's Report of Investigation had been completed and approved on March 26, 2020. The AO designation by DISA is dated March 29, 2020. (TAB V).

In 2015, DES underwent a significant change in how its mission work was to be performed. It underwent three near simultaneous events: (1) the contract to operate and maintain the DES which was being supported by contractor personnel in a Government-Owned-Constructor Operated relationship, was insourced and that work went to Department of the Army Civilians to perform; (2) the completion of the new state-of-the-art telecommunications facility; and (3) the technical capability to remote the operations. These actions offered significant opportunities for efficient and consolidated operations. However, Mr. [REDACTED] viewed the remote capabilities as presenting significant operational and security risks.

Regarding the technical capability to remote the operations, one of the improvements or proof of concept was to address the impending end of life of the DES antennas. In anticipation of the antennae replacement, the decision was made to remote the control, monitor, and alarm for the DES mission systems and equipment. This resulted in the antennae replacement effort currently underway to enhance the DES' remote capabilities. The new state-of-the-art building will house the DES equipment at the conclusion of the antennae replacement project. The old DES building will no longer be used for monitoring purposes and will be empty, available for re-purpose.

The antennas at the DES are being replaced and upgraded as part of life cycle replacement program. The DES antenna upgrade is one of seven projects that the Program Manager Defense Communications and Army Transmission Systems is responsible for executing. This was necessary as the antenna parts are no longer being supported by the vendor with replacement parts. The antenna upgrade project contract was awarded on June 6, 2018 and is projected for completion August 31, 2020 (TAB E). The DES antenna replacement is one of seven projects. At the conclusion of the antenna replacements, the new configuration will implement the remote monitoring of the new antennas' Control, Monitor, and Alarm (CMA) systems to the Gateway Telecommunications Center (GTC), where the current system is now remotod.

VI. DISCUSSION OF THE EVIDENCE AND FINDINGS

A. OSC REFERRED ALLEGATION 1: Despite the requirement for a Configuration Control Board (CCB) in the 2008 Information Assurance Plan for the C-Band Satellite Transmit and Receive Systems Direct Communications Link Earth Station (Information Assurance Plan), the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) has not established a CCB for the management of the Detrick Earth Station.

Mr. [REDACTED], Civilian Executive Officer, U.S. Army Signal Activity-Fort

Detrick, testified that he was aware of and acknowledged that a CCB should be convened. However, he testified that the 21st Signal Brigade is not the office of primary responsibility (OPR) for the CCB. He testified that it was his understanding that the Chair of the CCB is HQDA CIO/G-6. (TAB B – Testimony of [REDACTED]).

Mr. [REDACTED], Linguist, U.S. Army Signal Activity - Fort Detrick, testified that despite the requirement for a Configurations Control Board (CCB) in the 2008 Information Assurance Plan (IAP) (TAB H) for the C-Band Satellite Transmit and Receive Systems Direct Communications Link Earth Station, he has been concerned that despite the fact that his organization is aware of the requirement that a CCB is to be convened to manage the DES, a CCB has not met on a regular basis since 2008. Mr. [REDACTED] believed that the last time a CCB was conducted was in 2011. Mr. [REDACTED] asserted that a CCB may prevent a situation where a unilateral action by a single party may result in a major station revision such as new antennas or reconfigurations. An example of this would be having a remote operation without external oversight and no Risk Management Framework (RMF). (TAB C – Testimony of [REDACTED]).

Testimony was provided by Mr. [REDACTED], Defense Information System Agency (DISA IE), Director/Chief, Senior National Leadership Communications Division. Mr. [REDACTED] testified that he was aware of the requirement that the DES have a CCB and acknowledged that a CCB should be convened. However, Mr. [REDACTED] testified that the responsibility for the CCB belongs to the HQDA CIO/G-6. (TAB D – Testimony of [REDACTED]).

Mr. [REDACTED], Satellite Terminal Systems PdM Wideband Enterprise Satellite Systems (WESS), Program Executive Office – Electronic Information System (PEO-EIS), testified that he was concerned that the lack of a CCB has created serious risks for the DES. He had reached out to HQDA CIO/G-6, the assigned Chair of the CCB, for assistance. A representative from HQDA CIO/G-6 was invited to the Quarterly Program Review at Fort Detrick from 4-5 September 2019. However, no representative from HQDA CIO/G-6 participated. (TAB E – Testimony of [REDACTED]).

Mr. [REDACTED], Telecommunications Specialist, U.S. Army Signal Activity-Fort Detrick, did not provide any substantive testimony on this allegation as he was unaware of this requirement and could not offer any insight on this allegation. (TAB F – Testimony of [REDACTED]).

Also, COL [REDACTED], Director, Network & Space Integration, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Chief Information Office (HQDA CIO/G-6), testified on this matter. He testified that the current CIO/G-6 leadership was unaware of their role to serve as the Chair of the Configuration Control Board. (TAB G – Testimony of COL [REDACTED]).

Lastly, at this juncture it must be noted that since the Investigating Officer's Report of Investigation was completed and was approved by the Approving Authority on March 26, 2020, additional documents have been found that reflect that the CCB met at least once after 2008. After the AR 15-6 Approving Authority approved the Report of Investigating and directed the Commander, 21st Signal Brigade, to implement the Investigating Officer's approved recommendations, the Commander, 21st Signal Brigade, proceeded to ensure that not only all appropriate actions are being taken to implement those approved recommendations, but also to search for any additional internal documents documenting and are relevant to the OSC referred allegations. An ongoing search resulted in the minutes and agenda items for a CCB meeting that took place on May 22, 2012. (TAB U).

FINDING OF OSC REFERRED ALLEGATION #1. Based on the preponderance of the evidence, the allegation that since 2008, a CCB for the DES has not been established is *substantiated*. The Detrick Earth Station (DES) Direct Communication Link (DCL) is required to have a chartered Configuration Control Board (CCB). Nevertheless, in the absence of a CCB meeting not having been held for at least the past few years from 2015, and as a result of the many changes that have occurred at the DES since 2012, a full Risk Management review of the Information Assurance Plan is also warranted.

However, it is noted that Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) is *not* responsible for the establishment of, nor for the conduct of the CCB. DISA is the Advisory Committee lead. The Army is responsible for the establishment and conduct of the CCB for DES, and the 21st Signal Brigade serves as the Secretary of the CCB.

Based on the documents gathered by the Investigating Officer, on July 28, 2000, DISA designated the Army as the Lead Military Department (LMD) for the DCL, the Continuous Communications Link (CCL), and the Government to Government Communications Links (GGCLs). (TAB I). In accordance with Army Regulation (AR) 25-1, the Army Information Resources Management Program, dated 25 March 1997⁶, directed the Director of Information Systems for Command, Control, Communications and Computers (DISC4) to exercise configuration control over the Army information systems and other DOD systems for which the Army been given responsibility, which is cited on page 2 in the CCB Charter (TAB J). Consequently, HQDA CIO/G-6, formerly known as the DISC4, is responsible for serving as the Chair of the CCB. A signed copy of the CCB Charter dated 11 June 1999 documents the DISC4 role, on page 11. (TAB J).

Additionally, the Army Communications with Other Nations (CWON) Systems CCB, not dated, (TAB K), stipulates that the CWON Systems CCB operates under the

⁶ Army Regulation (AR) 25-1, the Army Information Resources Management Program, dated 25 March 1997 was recently revised and reflects not only a title change for AR 25-1 but also captures several changes to the organizations having responsibilities as well as the roles, duties, and responsibilities associated with Army's Information Management program. The revised and current version is Army Regulation (AR) 25-1, *the Army Information Technology*, dated 15 July 2019.

authority and in support of the Army Chief Information Officer/G6 (CIO/G-6) and the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) for support of Army CWON Systems. According to the Investigating Officer's observation, the 1999 CCB Charter (TAB J, page 6), states that DISA's role is to serve as the Chair of the CCB *Advisory* Committee.

Further, the former Brigade Commander of the 21st Signal Brigade (formerly the 1108th Signal Brigade) drafted a memo (TAB L) to request that the (HQDA) CIO/G-6 re-establish the CCB. However, this memorandum was never finalized for consideration by the (HQDA) CIO/G-6 or the designated Chair of the CCB. (TAB G, MFR). However, unfortunately, at the time the memo was drafted, the former commander of 21st Signal Brigade was preparing for a change of command which was to take place within the next 60 day timeframe. As a result, the memorandum was not completed before the change of command, and the new commander did not complete the staff action. Additionally, Tab M is a copy of the draft CCB Charter which also was never finalized. The failure to finalize this Charter also resulted in the lack of notification to the CCB to reestablish the CCB.

B. OSC REFERRED ALLEGATION #2: Since the 2015 reorganization and consolidation of Detrick Earth Station, there has not been full review of the Information Assurance Plan under the Risk Management Framework established in 2014.

Mr. [REDACTED] acknowledged that the DES requires a revised Information Assurance Plan (IAP) under the new Risk Management Framework (RMF). It is the responsibility of the 21st Signal Brigade to initiate and submit a completed IAP for the DES.

Mr. [REDACTED], as the Whistleblower, remained concerned that a review of the DES under the RMF has not occurred and he believes that his leadership has knowingly, willfully, and negligently placed at risk DOD information by not ensuring the implementation of the DOD security requirements in the DoD Instruction (DODI) 8500.01, paragraph 2.a.(2), page 2 (TAB O). He stated that the DoDI directs cybersecurity applicability to all DoD Information Technology (IT).

Mr. [REDACTED] testified that he was unable to provide verification that IAP has not been maintained for this system.

Mr. [REDACTED] testimony acknowledged that the DES requires a current IAP. However, in his role as the Project Manager for the Satellite Terminal Systems PdM Wideband Enterprise Satellite Systems (WESS), PEO-EIS, his office is not the office of primary responsibility (OPR) for this action.

With respect to Mr. [REDACTED] testimony regarding this allegation, Mr. [REDACTED]

testified that he is unaware of this requirement and offered no insight into this allegation. However, Mr. [REDACTED] did indicate that the technicians hired to work in the DES had their position descriptions (PD) in 2014, and were reassigned to work in the Gateway Telecommunications Center (GTC), the Technical Control Facility (TCF), and the Battalion System Control (SYSCON), in addition to the DES duties. Mr. [REDACTED] believes that the PD change along the relocation of personnel has resulted in the operation of the DES becoming a minor part of daily operations, and not a focus of the attention it deserves. The relocation of personnel included the addition of remote consoles to operate equipment that is in the DES facility (with no Information Assurance review), but it does not have full capability that is available from front panel operations and has had a negative impact on response times to operational problems at the DES.

FINDING OF OSC RFEFERRED ALLEGATION #2: The allegation that there has not been a full review of the Information Assurance Plan (IAP) under the Risk Management Framework is *substantiated*. Since the 2015 reorganization and consolidation of personnel at the DES, there has not been a full review of the IAP under the Risk Management Framework established in 2014. DoD Instruction 8500.01, *Cybersecurity*, and the DoDI 8510.01, *Risk Management Framework (RMF)*, are the authoritative documents governing risk management for DoD.

Unfortunately, the most recent documentation assessing the risk of the DES is dated March 7, 2008 (TAB E). This documentation is not in compliance with either the current DoD Instruction (DODI) 8500.01, *Cybersecurity*, paragraph 2.a.(2), page 2 (TAB O) directing cybersecurity applicability to all DOD Information Technology (IT), or the current DODI 8510.01, *Risk Management Framework (RMF)* dated 12 March 2014, enclosure 6, paragraph 1d, Security Plan, page 27 (TAB P). At TAB N is draft documentation providing the System Identification Profile of the DES. It is noted at TAB E, in the Senior National Leadership Communications (SNLC) Quarterly Program Review (QPR) briefing, that the stakeholders are working to determine if the DES should be processed through a customized RMF process.

The DoDI 8510.01 requirements were established in the newly issued requirements imposed by the 2014 DoDI. The DCL is not in compliance to date. But it will be when the RMF package is approved. In order to have an RMF package (which includes the IAP) processed, an Authorizing Official must be identified. That's Step 1. The second step is to create the RMF package to operate a system that will be sent to the Authorizing Official to provide the authorization to operate (ATO) that system. Since at the time of the Investigating Officer's Report of Investigating, the RMF was in the process of being initiated, and DISA had not identified the Authorizing Official (AO) for the DES,⁷ this

⁷ The AO designation for the DCL did not occur until after the Investigating Officer's Report of Investigation had been completed and approved on March 26, 2020. The AO designation of Mr. [REDACTED] by DISA is dated March 29, 2020. (TAB V).

process had not been completed until March 29, 2020. DISA is the system owner and should determine who the system AO duties are assigned. (TAB E).

C. OSC REFERRED ALLEGATION #3: Security and operational deficiencies attributable to remote operations persist at the Detrick Earth Station, including poor security monitoring leaving the facility vulnerable.

Mr. [REDACTED] testified that the DES is monitored 24/7 from the Gateway Telecommunications Center (GTC). The GTC was built in 2014 and was manned in 2015. At that time, leadership decided to consolidate the telecommunications mission and the DES mission to the GTC. To accomplish this, the DES operational mission was remotized to the GTC. From this facility, the DES mission is overseen and monitored 24/7 to assure the physical security of the external and internal perimeter of DES facility.

Testimony provided by the Whistleblower, Mr. [REDACTED] reflected his concern that the security of the DES is at risk as a result of the remote operations of the facility. Mr. [REDACTED] cites a specific incident in 2015 that occurred as a result of a power outage that rendered the facility inaccessible for almost an hour prior to manual accessibility. Fortunately, Mr. [REDACTED] asserted that he was in the facility and was able to mitigate the maintenance issue until the proper personnel were dispatched. However, Mr. [REDACTED] confirmed that the DES mission was not impacted.

Mr. [REDACTED] stated that the remote operations of the DES does not create a security risk. In fact, he testified that DoD has installed an unmanned Foreign Equipment Shelter (FES) behind the DES building. This shelter will provide critical communications support to our foreign partners.

Mr. [REDACTED] testified that he had no knowledge of this allegation.

Mr. [REDACTED] testified that an incident occurred in 2015 where power was lost to the DES. The response time was hindered by the inability of personnel to access the turnstile gate because the power was out. At the time, Mr. [REDACTED] was in the building and was able to react to the situation. However, the facility does have back-up power and the equipment had switched over to the back-up power.

FINDING OF THE OSC REFERRED ALLEGATION #3: The allegation that there are security and operational deficiencies attributable to remote operations is *unsubstantiated*. The DES requires a sufficient security plan as noted above in allegation 2. The DES is

designated as a stand-alone Information System (IS) and Platform IT (PIT) System and assigned security control sets may be tailored as appropriate with approval of the Authorizing Official (TAB P), DODI 8510.01 Risk Management Framework (RMF) dated 12 March 2014, enclosure 6 paragraph 1.b.(4), page 25. However, there is no documentation signed by the AO authorizing remote operations. The lack of administrative documentation for the system does not necessarily equate to poor cybersecurity practices. Nonetheless, a waiver or approval from the AO for remote operations is required. The process to request a waiver is governed by HQDA CIO/G-6.

D. OSC REFERRED ALLEGATION #4: The lack of a fire suppression system required by the Information Assurance Plan and a lack of a 24/7 personnel presence has led to security and operational deficiencies.

Mr. [REDACTED] discussed the reorganization of the satellite mission at Fort Detrick that have been consolidated into the GTC facility which opened in 2015. The consolidation of the TCF and DES missions into building 1688 as well as support from the DPW/Installation Fire Protection team is a more cost effective option for the 21st Signal Brigade given the resource constraints identified by the organization. Mr. [REDACTED] provided a copy of a memorandum from the Fort Detrick Fire and Emergency Services explaining how the lack of the appropriate level of fire detection was mitigated under the DPW/Installation Fire Protection Maintenance Contract (TAB B). Also provided by Mr. [REDACTED] is a DA Form 7278 Risk Level Worksheet (TAB B).

Mr. [REDACTED] testified that the incident cited in allegation 3 is the one critical incident that Mr. [REDACTED] cites as contributing to operations deficiencies. The fire suppression system is lacking in the DES but has been mitigated through coordination with the Fort Detrick Fire and Emergency Services (TAB B).

Mr. [REDACTED] was unable to confirm rather the lack of 24/7 manning has contributed to any security or operational deficiencies. He did confirm that a fire suppression system is a requirement for all earth stations regardless of when it was built (email at TAB D). Mr. [REDACTED] provided a copy of the DoD Building Codes for review (TAB D).

Mr. [REDACTED] had no knowledge of the merits of this allegation prior to being contacted the Investigating Officer (IO). However, in response to being queried on the subject, Mr. [REDACTED] provided two briefings for the Investigating Officer's review (TAB C): (1) the Senior National Leadership Communications (SNLC) Direct Communications Link (DCL) Modernization Project Brief, dated 14 August 2019; and (2) the SNLC Quarterly Program Review, dated 4-5 September 2019. The first briefing provided an overview of the approved modernization project to upgrade the antennas for the DES. Mr. [REDACTED] recommended in his correspondence that this project be halted in an effort to save taxpayer dollars. The second briefing provided

recommendations to submit the RMF paperwork to the Defense Information Systems Agency no later than 13 September 2019 (slide 3), and to reconvene the CCB on a quarterly basis (slide 11).

Regarding this allegation, Mr. [REDACTED] testified that he was concerned that the mission does not receive the level of oversight it deserves. He acknowledges that a fire detection capability was added to the building but not fire suppression. He further stipulated that personnel protective equipment has been neglected. He alleges that the Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs), Concepts of Operations (CONOPS), and physical security plan have not been revised since Honeywell departed in 2013.

FINDING OF OSC REFERRED ALLEGATION #4: The allegation that a lack of a fire suppression system has led to security and operational deficiencies is *unsubstantiated*. There was not enough evidence brought forth that substantiates the claim that security and operational deficiencies exist as a result of having no fire suppression system. Although there is no fire suppression system, for example, a sprinkler system, in 2015 the facility was able to mitigate this deficiency utilizing the DPW/Installation Fire Protection Maintenance Contract and also installed a state of the art fire alarm system. It was recommended by the Fort Detrick and Emergency Services Assistant Fire Chief that a wet sprinkler system be installed but is not required by applicable regulations or codes based on the date of the facilities construction (TAB B). It is noted that Mr. [REDACTED], DISA IE, Director, National Senior Leader Communications Division informed that a fire suppression system is a requirement for all earth stations regardless of when it was built (TAB D).

Based on the ample evidence contained in TABs B and D, it is clear that the 21st Signal Brigade is in compliance with the fire suppression requirements.

VII. INVESTIGATING OFFICER'S RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on her findings, the Investigating Officer recommended the following actions:

- a. Recommend that in accordance with the DCL Information Assurance Plan, a Chartered CCB be reestablished to provide configuration management oversight of the DES.
- b. Recommend the immediate initiation of the risk management process requirements at the DES in accordance with the new Risk Management Framework (RMF). The lack of administrative documentation for the system does not necessarily equate to poor cybersecurity practices. Nonetheless, it is required that the system obtain an Authority to Operate (ATO) in accordance with current Risk Management Framework policies and procedures. This allows the Approving Official (AO) to mitigate any cyber risks presented by the system and to address any

threat vulnerabilities. During the RMF assessment it is further recommended that the remote operations of the DES be assessed for approval or disapproval by the Authorizing Official (AO).

c. Recommend that the DES undergo an external agency facilities inspection to determine if the fire detection mitigates the requirement for a fire suppression system. Further recommend that the DES undergo an external physical security inspection to address the allegation of persistent physical security and operational deficiencies as a result of the lack of 24/7 personnel presence.

VIII. APPROVING AUTHORITY'S ACTIONS AND THEIR IMPLEMENTATION

COL [REDACTED], as the Approving Authority for the AR 15-6 Report of Investigation, approved the Report of Investigation and its findings and recommendations on March 24, 2020. Very shortly thereafter, on March 26, 2020, COL [REDACTED] directed that several follow up actions be taken, addressing them through the Commander, 7th Signal Command (Theater), to the Commander, 21st Signal Brigade, for appropriate action consistent with the findings. (TAB Q). Specifically, she directed that the Commander, 21st Signal Brigade take the following actions:

- a. Complete the Configuration Control Board (CCB) charter that was initiated by a previous 21st Signal Brigade Commander.
- b. Staff a memorandum through 7th Command, NETCOM, and ARCYBER, to CIO/G-6 requesting that the CIO/G-6 chair the CCB in accordance with Army regulation.
- c. Request Fort Detrick Fire Marshal conduct an inspection of the building.
- d. Initiate the risk management process requirements at Detrick Earth Station in accordance with the new risk management framework.

On April 3, 2020, COL [REDACTED], Commander, 21st Signal Brigade, issued two memorandum regarding his follow up action to COL [REDACTED] March 26, 2020 directive. The first memorandum reflected that COL [REDACTED] completed the four actions that COL [REDACTED] had directed in her March 26, 2020. He provided the supporting documents to reflect the completion of these actions. (TAB R). The second memorandum issued by COL [REDACTED] was his request which was forwarded and endorsed by his chain of commander to the Director, Networks, Services and Strategy Directorate, CIO/G-6, (SAIS) Pentagon, Washington, D. C., requesting that the CIO/G-6 restart of the Configuration Control Board (CCB) and its chartered governance process related to the Direct Communications Link (DCL) and its subcomponent, the

Detrick Earth Station (DES), the government-to-government (U.S. to Russia) satellite ground station subcomponent of the DCL. (TAB S).

On May 14, 2020, COL [REDACTED] provided a memorandum entitled “Update 1 – Implementation of Findings for Direct Communications Link (DCL) Detrick Earth Station (DES)” where he detailed (1) the results of the Fort Detrick Fire Marshal’s Inspection on April 6, 2020; (2) his May 6, 2020 briefing to MG David T. Isaacson, Director, Network, Services & Strategy, CIO/G-6, when he discussed his April 3, 2020 memorandum to MG Isaacson providing the history of the CCB and requesting the reestablishment of the CCB, the approval for the draft Charter, and the way forward; and (3) the Agenda items that were to be covered during the May 21, 2020 CCB meeting for which he and his team on May 12, 2020 “created the collaboration environment for the CCB and initiated the first meeting with all of the stakeholders and members.” DISA is one of the DCL CCB members. (TAB T). As a result of this new foundation effort, the DCL CCB met on May 21, 2020. Their next meeting is scheduled for June 11, 2020 where they are scheduled to continue the dialog and discuss, among other matters, the approval of the DCL CCB Charter and the appointment of DISA in a leadership role of the DCL CCB.

It should be noted that another corrective action directed by the Approving Authority has been completed. The Fort Detrick Fire Marshal’s Inspection took place on April 6, 2020 (TAB T, Enclosure 2) and provided the same inspection results as [REDACTED], Assistant Fire Chief – Prevention, had provided on September 10, 2019. The inspection report stated the following:

“In regards to [the] question on fire suppression and the facilities lack thereof, while it would be recommended to install a wet sprinkler system and supplemental clean agent system in this facility, it is not required by the applicable regulations or codes based on the date of the facilities construction, and it would only become a requirement if at any time the facility was renovated and those costs of the renovation exceeded 50% of the original construction cost. In regards to fire & life safety compliance of the facility. This building is in compliance with all DoD and Army regulations as well as any and all applicable NFPA codes and standards for an existing business occupancy such as this.”

Lastly, on March 29, 2020, Mr. [REDACTED], the Risk Management Executive/Authorizing Official from DISA, assumed responsibility as the Authorizing Official for the DCL. This designation allows the work to begin to create the Risk Management Framework package for the DCL. (TAB V). This action will further the process for completing the corrective action addressing the Risk Management Framework program requirements.

Department of the Army
Army Cyber Command, Washington-Moscow Direct
Communication Link (DCL), Detrick Earth Station
Fort Detrick, Maryland
Office of Special Counsel File Number DI-17-2168

| <u>Tab</u> | <u>Description</u> |
|-------------------|--|
| TAB A | Mr. [REDACTED], Civilian Deputy to the Commander, 21st Signal Brigade, Fort Detrick, Maryland |
| TAB B | Mr. [REDACTED], Civilian Executive Officer, U.S. Army Signal Activity-Fort Detrick, Maryland |
| TAB C | Mr. [REDACTED], Linguist, US Army Signal Activity-Fort Detrick, Maryland |
| TAB D | Mr. [REDACTED], DISA IE, Director, National Senior Leader Communications Division |
| TAB E | Mr. [REDACTED], Satellite Terminal Systems, PdM Wideband Enterprise Satellite Systems (WESS), PEO-EIS, Fort Belvoir, Virginia Briefing Charts – Senior National Leadership Communications, Direct Communications Link (DCL) Modernization Project Brief, Fort Detrick, 14 Aug 2019, Presented by [REDACTED] |
| TAB F | Mr. [REDACTED], Telecommunications Specialist, U.S. Army Signal Activity, Fort Detrick, Maryland |
| TAB G | COL [REDACTED], Director, Network & Space Integration, HQDA CIO/G6 |
| TAB H | Information Assurance Plan for the C-Band Satellite Transmit and Receive Systems DCL Earth Station |
| TAB I | Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Subject: Designation of the Army as Lead Military Department (LMD) for the Direct Communications Link DCL), the Continuous Communications |

Link (CCL) and the Government-to-Government Communications Links (GGCLs), dated 28 July 2000


| | |
|--------------|--|
| TAB J | Signed copy of the Configuration Control Board (CCB) Charter dated of June 11, 1999 |
| TAB K | Army Communications With Other Nations (CWON) Systems CCB |
| TAB L | Draft memo for the CIO/G6 to re-establish the CCB – Memorandum, Subject: Direct Communications Link (DCL) Configuration Control Board (CCB) dated 2 Apr 18 |
| TAB M | Draft Configuration Control Board (CCB) Charter (not finalized) |
| TAB N | Regional Hub Node System Identification Profile, dated 7 Mar 08 |
| TAB O | Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 8500.01, <i>Cybersecurity</i> , dated March 14, 2014 |
| | Briefing Charts – Final SNLC QPR Fort Detrick, 2019 Sep 4-5 |
| TAB P | Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 8510.01, <i>Risk Management Framework (RMF)</i> for DoD Information Technology, dated March 12, 2014, Incorporating Change 2, July 28, 2017 |
| TAB Q | Memorandum THRU Commander, 7 th Signal Command (Theater), FOR Commander, 21 st Signal Brigade, dated March 26, 2020, Subject: Approval of Report of Investigation for Whistleblower Investigation Concerning Office of Special Counsel Referral DI-17-2168, Department of the Army, 1st Personnel Command, Washington-Moscow Direct Communications Link, Detrick Earth Station, Fort Detrick, Maryland |
| TAB R | Memorandum THRU Commanding General (NETC-SFC-CG), 7th Signal Command (Theater), FOR Commanding General (NETC-CG), Network Enterprise Technology (NETCOM), dated April 3, 2020, Subject: Implementation of Findings for Direct Communications Link (DCL) Detrick Earth Station (DES), with 4 Enclosures: <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Draft CCB Charter2. CCB Restart Memo, April 3, 20203. Fire Marshall Memo, April 2, 20204. DISA Form 9, February 25, 2020 |
| TAB S | Memorandum THRU Commanding General (NETC-SFC-CG), 7th Signal Command (Theater), Commanding General (NETC-CG), Network Enterprise Technology (NETCOM), Commanding General (ARCC-CG), United States |

Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER), FOR Director, Networks, Services and Strategy Directorate, CIO/G-6, (SAIS), dated April 3, 2020, Subject: Direct Communications Link (DCL) Configuration Control Board (CCB)

- TAB T** Memorandum for Record, dated May 14, 2020, Subject: Update 1 – Implementation of Findings for Direct Communications Link (DCL) Detrick Earth Station (DES), with 3 Enclosures:
1. Implementation Memo, April 3, 2020
 2. Fire Marshall Memo, April 2, 2020
 3. Agenda, CCB Meeting May 21, 2020
- TAB U** Minutes (and Attendance List/Roster) of The Direct Communications Link (DCL) Configuration Control Board (CCB) Meeting 22 May 2012
- TAB V** Approval Document by DISA Risk Management Official/Authorizing Official [REDACTED], signed March 29, 2020, ANNEX C: BLUE TEAM/STRATEGIC VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY/CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICES, CYBERSECURITY DIRECTORATE, MISSION READINESS, TERMS AND CONDITIONS,) Version 4.1 (U) 09 October 2019
- TAB W** Witness List (only in Unredacted version)

TAB A

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

 The Privacy Act of 1974 prohibits any department or agency of the Federal Government from releasing and personal information about an individual without that individual's written permission.

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
U.S. ARMY CYBER COMMAND
8825 BEULAH STREET
FORT BELVOIR, VIRGINIA 22060-5246

ARCC-OPF

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Whistleblower Investigation Concerning Office of Special Counsel (OSC) Referral DI-17-2168, Department of the Army (Army) 1st Personnel Command, Washington-Moscow Direct Communications Link (DCL), Detrick Earth Station, Fort Detrick, Maryland

1. On 21 August 2019 I met with Mr. [REDACTED] Civilian Deputy to the Commander/ Chief Information Officer (CIO), 21st Signal Brigade at Fort Detrick, MD. Mr. [REDACTED] assumed this role in 2018 and is not a witness for this case.
2. I advised him that I am the assigned investigating officer conducting an inquiry in to the alleged conduct that may constitute a violation of law, rule, or regulation, gross mismanagement, and substantial and specific danger to public safety.
3. Mr. [REDACTED] provided me with an overview of the DES mission and the enclosed slide at Tab E identifying the authorized and on hand personnel at the US Army Signal Activity – Detrick. This slide identifies the on-going projects to include the DOD approved DES antenna upgrade.
4. I concluded my meeting with Mr. [REDACTED] at 1030 hours on 21 August 2019.
5. POC for this memorandum is the undersigned at 703-[REDACTED] or [REDACTED]@mail.mil.

[REDACTED]

GS 15
Investigating Officer



US Army Signal Activity - Detrick



CPT Thomas
1SG Ayers

May 2016 – June 2017
January 2016 – June 2017



Operate and maintain the Detrick Earth Station (DES), a dual Standardized Tactical Entry Point (STEP) facility, Technical Control Facility (TCF), Modernization of Enterprise Terminal (MET) and the Battalion Systems Control (SYSCON) in order to provide and defend DoD Information Networks (DoDIN) and Defense Information Systems Networks (DISN) access capabilities for the President, Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Warfighting Combatant Commanders, the Military Services, and other Federal Agencies.

Mission Systems

WGS AN/GSC-52 (x2)
STEP (x2)
TCF w/2k+ circuits
Detrick Earth Station (DES)
BN SYSCON function
Dual DISN Core / WHCA node
AFSCN (53d SIG BN)
FES

Personnel

| | AUTH | OH | % | +90 | +120 |
|-----|------|----|------|-----|------|
| MIL | 57 | 63 | 111% | 61 | 62 |
| 25S | 32 | 24 | 75% | 26 | 24 |
| DAC | 32 | 25 | 78% | 29 | 29 |
| CTR | 0 | 0 | N/A | N/A | N/A |

Agreements

Department of State

Shift Schedule

Panama Schedule (4 shifts, 12 hrs, 3-2-2-3)
Watch Officer - DAC led
DAC & Soldier manned (25S & P)

Constraints

5 nines availability (<5.5 min/yr)
Highly diverse technical systems
Russian linguist per shift

Un-resourced

Facilities management (x1)
BN SYSCON function (24/7)
CMST (x2)
MCATS/TRIPS LNO (x5)
Garrison Funeral Honors & CAO/CNO
Garrison Flag & SDO details

Partnerships

Department of State
USS George Washington
US Space Command
Garrison Power House (24/7)
A/53d Signal Battalion (SATCON)

Projects

TCF migration underway
ESS system upgrade needed
FES construction underway
DES antenna upgrade
SUNS installation
RHN GAIT NOC FY22
CUPP transition planned in FY20+

302d Signal Battalion

We are the "Gateway to Freedom."

UNCLASSIFIED 6

TABLE

TAB B

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

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ARCC-OPF

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Whistleblower Investigation Concerning Office of Special Counsel (OSC) Referral DI-17-2168, Department of the Army (Army) 1st Personnel Command, Washington-Moscow Direct Communications Link (DCL), Detrick Earth Station, Fort Detrick, Maryland

1. On 21 August 2019 I met with Mr. [REDACTED] Civilian Executive Officer, US Army Signal Activity-Fort Detrick. I advised him that I am the assigned investigating officer conducting an inquiry in to the alleged conduct that may constitute a violation of law, rule, or regulation, gross mismanagement, and substantial and specific danger to public safety. I read the privacy statement and reiterated at the end our interview that these proceedings were to remain undisclosed. As such, the following allegations were investigated.
2. Pertaining to allegation 1 -why, despite the requirement for a Configurations Control Board (CCB) in the 2008 Information Plan for the C-Band Satellite Transmit and Receive Systems Direct Communications Link Earth Station Mr. [REDACTED] is aware of and acknowledged that a CCB should be convened. The Chair of the CCB is HQDA CIO/G6.
3. Pertaining to allegation 2 - why, since the 2015 reorganization and consolidation of Detrick Earth Station, has there not been a full review the Information Assurance Plan (IAP) under the Risk Management Framework established in 2014, Mr. [REDACTED] acknowledged that the DES requires a revised IAP under the new Risk Management Framework (RMF).
4. Pertaining to allegation 3 - why have there been security and operational deficiencies attributable to remote operations persist at the Detrick Earth Station, including poor security monitoring, that have left the facility vulnerable, Mr. [REDACTED] informed that the DES is monitored 24/7 from the Gateway Telecommunications Center (GTC). The GTC was built in 2014 and manned in 2015. At that time, leadership decided to consolidate the telecommunications mission and the DES mission at the GTC. To accomplish this the DES operational mission was remoted to the GTC. From this facility the DES mission is overseen and monitored 24/7 to assure the physical security of the external and internal perimeter of DES facility.
5. Pertaining to allegation 4 - whether the lack of a fire suppression system

ARCC-OPF

SUBJECT: SUBJECT: Whistleblower Investigation Concerning Office of Special Counsel (OSC) Referral DI-17-2168, Department of the Army (Army) 1st Personnel Command, Washington-Moscow Direct Communications Link (DCL), Detrick Earth Station, Fort Detrick, Maryland

required by the Information Assurance Plan and a lack of 24/7 personnel presence has led to security and operational deficiencies, Mr. [REDACTED] discussed the reorganization of the satellite mission at Fort Detrick that have been consolidated into the GTC facility which opened in 2015. Mr. [REDACTED] provided a copy of a memorandum from the Fort Detrick Fire and Emergency Services explaining how the lack of the appropriate level of fire detection was mitigated under the DPW/Installation Fire Protection Maintenance Contract (Tab F). Also provided by Mr. [REDACTED] is a DA Form 7278 Risk Level Worksheet (Tab F).

6. I concluded my interview with Mr. [REDACTED] at 1100 hours on 21 August 2019.

7. POC for this memorandum is the undersigned at 703-[REDACTED] or [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

GS 15
Investigating Officer

TAB F
1

R CIV USARMY ARCYBER (USA)

From: [REDACTED] E CIV USARMY 21 SIG BDE (USA)
Sent: Friday, August 30, 2019 12:31 PM
To: [REDACTED] R CIV USARMY ARCYBER (USA)
Cc: [REDACTED] CIV USARMY 21 SIG BDE (US)
Subject: RE: Visit (UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO PROTECTED BY PRIVACY ACT)
Signed By: [REDACTED].civ@mail.mil

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO PROTECTED BY PRIVACY ACT

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROTECTED BY PRIVACY ACT

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROTECTED BY PRIVACY ACT

Ms. [REDACTED]

I wanted to make sure to touch base with you before the end of the week:

1. I met with the Fort Detrick Fire Department; Chief [REDACTED] on Wednesday 28 August 2019:

Chief [REDACTED] visited the station and agreed to provide an official assessment of his findings. I will forward you a copy as soon as I receive it.

As a read ahead, his finding is that the Detrick Earth Station (DES) meets and exceeds all Fire Codes. He indicated that from a fire safety perspective; people onsite, 24/7 neither increases nor decreases mission assurance because an occupants primary responsibility is to evacuate the building not to fight fires. They indicated under new codes, in many circumstances Fire Extinguishers are being removed from building because they can be misused and actually cause more harm than good. The Fire Chief offered to submit a bid for automatic CO2 fire suppression for the Foreign Equipment Shelter (FES) and future DES antenna shelters. These fire suppression systems would cost approximately \$25K per unit (*3 = \$75K). The Fire Chief stated that the system has safety-check features prior to discharge and will give an audible command to evacuate the area with a subsequent 30 secs before discharge. Because of these built in safety delays, the Chief stated that because of Fort Detrick Fire Department's proximity to the site, it is likely that firefighter would arrive on-site roughly the same time the suppression systems discharge.

2. I contacted Fort Detrick Physical Security manager; Mr. [REDACTED]:

On Thursday, Mr. [REDACTED] sent me resources (DA Pam 190-51 and AR 190-51) to conduct a "self-analysis". I have assigned one of my personnel to "self-assess". Mr. [REDACTED] advises that he will help as needed. Mr. [REDACTED] also responded to the question of whether or not there are any records of authorized personnel ever breaching the DES's security measures; he said there are no records of such an event.

3. Summary:

a. Fire Safety: I believe that the official findings of the Fort Detrick Fire Department will show this concern to be unwarranted.

b. Physical Security / Mission Assurance: The determination of whether or not these standards are being met will take some time. Absence of DCL CCB guidance has rendered the standards unclear. Within the last several years DISA SNLC has been asked for guidance such as a classification guide and FES O&M procedures. DISA SNLC presented valid reasons why they could not produce either; briefly the reasons were both associated with the lack of an active governing body. The very good news is that the DCL CCB (governing body) will meet on September 4 & 5 at Fort Detrick. I will attempt to introduce the drafting of an Information Assurance Plan as an agenda item. In the mean-time while we await the establishment of these standards, my personnel will self-assess the DES's physical security stature.

V/R

[REDACTED]
CXO, USASA-Detrack
Office: (301)619-3604
Cell: (240)481-9837

it was not achievable t I discussed the absence of a classification guide. When I

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] R CIV USARMY ARCYBER (USA)
Sent: Wednesday, August 28, 2019 10:42 AM
To: [REDACTED] E CIV USARMY 21 SIG BDE (USA) <[REDACTED].civ@mail.mil>
Cc: [REDACTED] CIV USARMY 21 SIG BDE (US)
<[REDACTED].civ@mail.mil>
Subject: Re: Visit (UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO PROTECTED BY PRIVACY ACT)

Thank you [REDACTED].

Sent from my iPhone

> On Aug 27, 2019, at 2:01 PM, [REDACTED] E CIV USARMY 21 SIG BDE (USA)
<[REDACTED].civ@mail.mil> wrote:
>
> Ma am,
>
> I have a meeting scheduled with the Fort Detrick Fire Chief tomorrow



Fort Detrick Fire and Emergency Services
1419 Sultan Drive
Fort Detrick, MD 21702-5000
Phone 301-619-2528
Fax 301-619-2163

TABF
2

Date: 9/10/2019
Mr. [REDACTED]
CXO, 298th Signal Co.
USAG/Ft. Detrick

Mr. [REDACTED]

I am writing this in response to your questions regarding Building 1650 and whether it is in compliance with all the applicable codes and standards related to fire and life safety.

As you are aware back in 2015 it was identified that the facility in question did in fact lack the appropriate level of fire detection, however we were able to get this deficiency corrected utilizing the DPW/Installation Fire Protection Maintenance Contract and installed a state of the art, fully addressable fire alarm system and later we were able to provide detection in the foreign equipment sheds to provide supervision of those assets as well.

In regards to your question on fire suppression and that facilities lack thereof, while it would be recommended to install a wet sprinkler system and supplemental clean agent system in this facility, it is not required by the applicable regulations or codes based on the date of the facilities construction, and it would only become a requirement if at any time the facility was renovated and those costs of the renovation exceeded 50% of the original construction cost.

In regards to fire & life safety compliance of the remainder of the facility. This building is in compliance with all DoD & Army regulations as well as any and all applicable NFPA codes and standards for an existing business occupancy such as this.

If you have any further questions or if I can be assistance in any other way please do not hesitate to contact me.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Assistant Fire Chief - Prevention
Ft. Detrick/Forest Glen Fire & Emergency Services



Fort Detrick Fire and Emergency Services
1419 Sultan Drive
Fort Detrick, MD 21702-5000
Phone 301-619-2528
Fax 301-619-2163

TABF
3

Fire Safety for Building 1650

Attendees:

USASA-Fort Detrick: Mr. [REDACTED]

Fort Detrick Fire and Emergency Services: Asst. Fire Chief [REDACTED]

Baltimore Fire Protection Equipment (BFPE) Representative: Mr. [REDACTED]

Actions:

A meeting of the attendees listed above was held at the Detrick Earth Station (DES), Building 1650 Porter Street on August 28, 2019. The subject of the meeting was to determine the fire safety compliance of the station. Mr. [REDACTED] briefed the Assistant Fire Chief and the BFPE representative of the current station status and the upcoming changes to the building and missions. The key points of the briefing were:

1. All satellite link related telecommunications equipment is to be relocated from its current location in the Operations Room of Building 1650 to the concrete equipment shelters which will be located at the base of the new satellite antenna risers. The first concrete shelter is to be put into place in November 2019 and the second in July 2020.
2. Direct Communications Link (DCL) foreign equipment will be placed in the Foreign Equipment Shelter (FES). This shelter has already been connected to the Fort Detrick Fire Alarm Network.
3. A new 100KVA UPS will replace the existing 50KVA UPS in the UPS & Battery Room.

A fire safety inspection was conducted following the meeting:

1. Asst. Fire Chief [REDACTED] indicated that the station currently meets or exceeds unmanned fire safety standards.
2. Mr. [REDACTED] BFPE discussed the possibilities of installing an automatic fire suppression system into each of the three equipment shelters. He stated that because of the proximity of the Fort Detrick Fire Station, and the Fire System discharge safety delays, it is possible that Fort Detrick Firefighters might be on site prior to automatic system discharge. He stated that a "ballpark cost" of each system would be \$25K.

Asst. Chief [REDACTED] email a letter with his findings and recommendations (attached)

Assessment:

3.

1. The DES meets fire safety standards. Whether the station is staffed or unstaffed does not alter the findings based on:
 - a. Fires are more likely where humans are present
 - b. The primary obligation of a human is to safely evacuate the scene of a fire
 - c. New fire codes often require the removal of firefighting equipment
2. Automatic Fire Suppression is not recommended based upon system projects which are currently underway. These configuration changes will dramatically alter the existing infrastructure:
 - a. Enhanced diversification and redundancy of the DES systems and missions. Single fire events capable of causing a station isolation will be almost completely eliminated.
 - b. Telecommunications equipment will be migrated into concrete reinforced shelters which are vastly more fire resistant than the current equipment room.
 - c. Human creature-comfort items which are more hazardous from a fire safety standpoint, such as heaters, stoves, coffeepots, etc. will not be permitted within the equipment shelters.
3. The assertion that the DES is more vulnerable because it is unstaffed during non-business hours is not supported by the facts found in a Fort Detrick Fire Services inspection.

Physical Security Assessment for Building 1650

Actions:

The Detrick Earth Station (DES), 1650 Porter Street, Fort Detrick, MD, 57102-5002 was assessed for Physical Property and Operational Security.

1. Mr. [REDACTED], US Army Garrison Fort Detrick, Physical Security Specialist, was consulted to assist in conducting a security assessment of the DES. Mr. [REDACTED] provided DA PAM 190-51, AR 190-51 and DA FORM 7278 by which to conduct a self-assessment.
2. In accordance with DA PAM 190-51 and AR 190-51, a DA FORM 7278 (Risk Level Worksheet) was generated. The assessed risk value of the DES Physical Protective Measures and Security Procedural Measures were assessed as level II.

Assessment:

1. The DES meets or exceeds Risk Level II standards.
2. The DES is located within the perimeter of Fort Detrick. It is secured by a fence line and roving guards on a 24/7/365 basis. In addition to these security layers, the facility is located within a second fence-line which is reinforced with braided cable. All property is contained within one of various buildings or containers within the compound. All of the buildings and containers are equipped with restricted badge access, intrusion detection, and security cameras. The station is manned during normal business hours and then alarmed and locked when personnel are not present. The DES is checked on a random basis by security guards and telecommunications technicians. All property is secured and accounted for IAW Army policy.

RISK LEVEL WORKSHEET

For use of this form, see DA PAM 190-51; the proponent agency is OPMG

| | | |
|--|---|-------------------------------|
| Unit or Organization: USASA - FORT DETRICK | Inspected Resource: Building 1650 (Detrick Earth Station) | Analyst: [REDACTED] |
| Resource Location: 1650 Porter St., Ft. Detrick, MD, 21702 | Resource Category: C | Date: 20190913 |

| Resource Value Factors | | | | | | Aggressor Likelihood Factors | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|---|--|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|--|--|--|------------------------------|---|---|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------|---|--|---|-------------------------------------|---|----------------------------------|--|
| Criticality to Army's Mission (Table 2-2) | Criticality to User's Mission (Table 2-3) | Resource Replaceability (Tables 2-4 or 2-4a) | Relative Value (Tables 2-5 to 2-16) | Sum of Value Ratings (Table 2-19) | Resource Value Rating (Table 2-19) | | | | Resource Profile (Table 3-3) | Usefulness for Resource with Cash Value (Table 3-4) | Usefulness to Aggressor Goals (Table 3-5) | Publicity Value (Table 3-6) | Resource Availability (Table 3-7) | Local Incidents in the Past (Table 3-8) | Nearby Incidents in the Past (Table 3-9) | Potential for Future Incidents (Table 3-10) | Accessibility (Tables 3-11 to 3-14) | Effectiveness of Law Enforcement (Table 3-15) | Deferrance (Tables 3-16 or 3-17) | Sum of Likelihood Factors (Table 3-18) |
| 4 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 16 | H | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Unsophisticated Criminals | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 16 |
| | | | | | | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sophisticated Criminals | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 16 |
| | | | | | | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Organized Criminal Groups | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 16 |
| | | | | | | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Domestic Terrorists | | | 2 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 19 |
| | | | | | | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> International Terrorists | | | 3 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 25 |
| | | | | | | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> State Sponsored Terrorists | | | 4 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 26 |
| | | | | | | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Insider Threat | | | 5 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 21 |
| Description: Antennas and hardware; Internally-located equipment on the SATCOM Floor and the Storage Area. FES Enclosure & equipment | | | | | | Highest Aggressor Group Likelihood Factors | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 26 |
| | | | | | | Aggressor Likelihood Rating (Table 3-18) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | M |
| | | | | | | Risk Level (Value and Likelihood Combined) (Table 1-2) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | II |

TAB 5

morning. I will work hard to get you a written/signed assessment on that meeting ASAP.

>
> As for the Physical Security Report; I haven't been able to schedule time with the Post Physical Security Manager. I will drive that agenda hard when I return to work tomorrow.

>
> VR
>
> [REDACTED]
> CXO, ASA-DET
> (301) [REDACTED]

> Sent from my iPhone

>
>> On Aug 27, 2019, at 12:47 PM, [REDACTED] R CIV USARMY ARCYBER (USA)
<[REDACTED]@mail.mil> wrote:

>>
>> CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROTECTED BY PRIVACY ACT

>>
>> Gentlemen,

>>
>> Still awaiting the receipt of the Fort Detrick Fire Station
>> assessment/report regarding the fire suppression requirement for the DES,
>> also request a copy of the Physical Security Report.

>> r [REDACTED]

>>
>> -----Original Message-----

>> From: [REDACTED] CIV USARMY 21 SIG BDE (US)
>> Sent: Thursday, August 22, 2019 7:34 AM
>> To: [REDACTED] R CIV USARMY ARCYBER (USA) <[REDACTED]@mail.mil>
>> Cc: [REDACTED] E CIV USARMY 21 SIG BDE (USA) <[REDACTED]civ@mail.mil>
>> Subject: Visit (UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO PROTECTED BY PRIVACY ACT)

>>
>> CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROTECTED BY PRIVACY ACT

>>
>> Ms. [REDACTED]

>>
>> It was good to meet you yesterday and orient you to Fort Detrick.

>>
>> Craig will work to get you all the documents you need.

>>
>> Please let us know if you need anything else to complete your actions.

>>
>> [REDACTED]

>>
>> [REDACTED]
>> Civilian Deputy to the Commander /
>> Chief Information Officer

>> 21st Signal Brigade
>>
>> 1435 Porter Street
>> Fort Detrick, Maryland 21702
>>
>> Office: (301) [REDACTED]
>> DSN: (312) [REDACTED]
>> Mobile: (240) [REDACTED]
>> Email: [REDACTED]@mail.mil

>> CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROTECTED BY PRIVACY
ACT


>> CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROTECTED BY PRIVACY
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CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROTECTED BY PRIVACY ACT

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROTECTED BY PRIVACY ACT

TAB C

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT


The Privacy Act of 1974 prohibits any department or agency of the Federal Government from releasing and personal information about an individual without that individual's written permission.

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
U.S. ARMY CYBER COMMAND
8825 BEULAH STREET
FORT BELVOIR, VIRGINIA 22060-5246

ARCC-OPF

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Whistleblower Investigation Concerning Office of Special Counsel (OSC) Referral DI-17-2168, Department of the Army (Army) 1st Personnel Command, Washington-Moscow Direct Communications Link (DCL), Detrick Earth Station, Fort Detrick, Maryland

1. On 21 August 2019 I conducted a face to face interview with Mr. [REDACTED] Linguist, US Army Signal Activity-Fort Detrick. Our interview began at approximately 1300 hours. I advised him that I am the assigned investigating officer conducting an inquiry in to the alleged conduct that may constitute a violation of law, rule, or regulation, gross mismanagement, and substantial and specific danger to public safety. I read the privacy statement and reiterated at the end our interview that these proceedings were to remain undisclosed. As such, the following allegations were investigated.

2. Pertaining to allegation 1 - why, despite the requirement for a Configurations Control Board (CCB) in the 2008 Information Assurance Plan (IAP) (Tab L) for the C-Band Satellite Transmit and Receive Systems Direct Communications Link Earth Station Mr. [REDACTED] remains concerned that despite the fact that his organization is aware of the requirement for a CCB to be convened to manage the DES a CCB has not met on a regular basis since 2008.

3. Pertaining to allegation 2 - why, since the 2015 reorganization and consolidation of Detrick Earth Station, has there not been a full review the Information Assurance Plan (IAP) under the Risk Management Framework (RMF) established in 2014, Mr. [REDACTED] remains concerned that a review of the DES under the RMF has not occurred.

4. Pertaining to allegation 3 - why have there been security and operational deficiencies attributable to remote operations persist at the Detrick Earth Station, including poor security monitoring, that have left the facility vulnerable, Mr. [REDACTED] expressed concern that the security of the DES is at risk as a result of the remote operations of the facility. Mr. [REDACTED] cites a specific incident in 2015 that occurred as a result of a power outage that rendered the facility inaccessible for almost an hour prior to manual accessibility. Fortunately, Mr. [REDACTED] was in the facility and was able to mitigate the maintenance issue until the proper personnel were dispatched.

ARCC-OPF

SUBJECT: SUBJECT: Whistleblower Investigation Concerning Office of Special Counsel (OSC) Referral DI-17-2168, Department of the Army (Army) 1st Personnel Command, Washington-Moscow Direct Communications Link (DCL), Detrick Earth Station, Fort Detrick, Maryland

5. Pertaining to allegation 4 - whether the lack of a fire suppression system required by the Information Assurance Plan and a lack of 24/7 personnel presence has led to security and operational deficiencies. The incident cited in allegation 3 is the one critical incident that Mr. [REDACTED] cites as contributing to operation deficiencies. The fire suppression system is lacking in the DES but has been mitigated through coordination with the Fort Detrick Fire and Emergency Services (Tab F).

6. I concluded my interview with Mr. [REDACTED] at 1455 hours on 21 August 2019 and provided him email contact below if there was other information he wanted to provide for review. Mr. [REDACTED] sent ten separate emails enclosed at Tab G for my review.

7. POC for this memorandum is the undersigned at 703-[REDACTED] or [REDACTED]@mail.mil.

[REDACTED]
GS 15
Investigating Officer

TAB G

CIV USARMY ARCYBER (USA)

From: [REDACTED] CIV USARMY 21 SIG BDE (USA)
Sent: Friday, August 23, 2019 8:11 AM
To: [REDACTED] CIV USARMY ARCYBER (USA)
Subject: RE: DES Documentation (UNCLASSIFIED)
Signed By: [REDACTED] civ@mail.mil

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

Good morning, Ms. [REDACTED]

I will have additional documentation to you as soon as possible.

I was unable to access web.mail.mil from home using my CAC reader, so I was unable to immediately provide the documents I showed you on Wednesday.

I am now at work and should have time to get you more information today.

I regret to report I may have more documents to send your way by Monday (I am working Fri-Sat-Sun). The situation we are addressing has been ongoing since before 2015, so to ensure we have the full picture for discovery -- there is quite a paper trail.

I will also include a copy of my correspondence with the Office of the Special Counsel, which includes documents and the original disclosure that I submitted to them. It in no way reveals the inner deliberations of their investigation, which was almost completely opaque to me. I sent to OSC the same information I would provide to any investigator. It will give you some insight into how it took 862 days for them to take action (OSC is required by US Code to make a referral or decline within 45 days).

Thanks again for your efforts and I will be in touch soon.

V/R

[REDACTED]
Senior Shift Language Specialist
Detrick Earth Station
301-619-8220
DSN: 343-8220

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] CIV USARMY ARCYBER (USA)
Sent: Thursday, August 22, 2019 2:16 PM
To: [REDACTED] CIV USARMY 21 SIG BDE (USA) <[REDACTED]@mail.mil>
Subject: DES Documentation (UNCLASSIFIED)

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

Mr [REDACTED]

Thank you for your time yesterday. I appreciate your input. Please feel free to send me any additional documentation that you feel is pertinent to discovery.

r/Ms [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
DODIN Operations, Modernization Chief
G35, Future Operations (FUOPS) Cyber Planning
U. S. Army Cyber Command
8825 Beulah Street
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

[REDACTED]@mail.mil
[REDACTED]@mail.smil.mil

UNCLAS: 703-[REDACTED] (DSN: 235)

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

TABG

CIV USARMY ARCYBER (USA)

From: [REDACTED] CIV USARMY 21 SIG BDE (USA)
Sent: Friday, August 23, 2019 2:42 PM
To: [REDACTED] CIV USARMY ARCYBER (USA)
Subject: RE: DES Documentation (UNCLASSIFIED)
Attachments: Decapitation & Evisceration of the Washington-Moscow Hotline 2015.docx; MG [REDACTED] Email 20151016.pdf
Signed By: [REDACTED] civ@mail.mil
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

Ms. [REDACTED]

Some up-to-date notes on the attached document:

This is just a quick run-through.

I believe as a result of my efforts to notify MG [REDACTED] in 2015, the FES site was moved from next to the GTC to behind DES (in the isolated DES compound, where all foreign-connected equipment should be). I believe a significant cost savings was realized due to the simple power hookup available at DES.

The 2015 AR 15-6 report revealed that no one knew what the State Dept was paying \$300K for annually (maybe a Configuration Control Board would know).

I only learned last year the answer to the question of where the GS-13 position authorized for DES by the Secretary of the Army in 2012 disappeared to. It was given to Mr. [REDACTED] (now retired) at the Battalion. I remember a SATCOM technician in 2013 telling me how unhelpful Mr. [REDACTED] was in answering questions the technician had. Mr. [REDACTED] had been the project manager for DES for many years when Honeywell ran the station, but seemed unwilling to share any experience.

Eight civilian SATCOM technicians were hired for DES in 2013 -- the configuration was 4 GS-12 and 4 GS-11. Today only two of those technicians remain -- very rarely working at DES, they are almost always at the GTC across the street. One has been promoted to GS-12 (Mr. [REDACTED]); the other remains a GS-11 (Mr. [REDACTED]). Mr. [REDACTED] was one of those hired as a GS-12 SATCOM technician for DES, although he was Tech Control (25P) by former Army specialty. The loss of a \$54,000 high-power amplifier at DES a couple of years ago seems to have been his inexperienced handiwork. Most of the SATCOM technicians who found employment elsewhere were disillusioned by being hired to work DES and then being coerced to work SYSCON or later the GTC across the street.

So we have TWO "experienced" DES technicians, both "junior" in experience as far as SATCOM goes. That's a problem because we have FOUR shifts. And

employees take leave.

Three strands of barbed wire did appear over the turnstile in 2016. Took three years.

Ms. [REDACTED], the former DES Russian linguist, is now Deputy Secretary General of NATO.

The Battalion did not follow NETCOM instructions to remedy the majority of issues. I was told by the AR 15-6 investigating officer to "wait till the dust settles." I was told in April 2016 that the Battalion had 30 days to report completion of the tasks. In the summer of 2016, I contacted COL [REDACTED] the new 21st Brigade commander, and gave her a copy of the attached document. She assisted with the back foreign language proficiency back pay issue and appeared interested in the Configuration Control Board, but did not seem to respond to any of the other issues. The back pay issue took two years and eight months to resolve, *after* NETCOM instructed that I be paid and that the decision had undergone legal review.

I gave up on local leadership in 2017 and contacted the Office of the Special Council (OSC) in February of that year.

The OSC took 862 days to refer the disclosures for investigation by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The Word document does contain embedded files. If you cannot open them, please let me know and I will send them expanded as separate files.

The reference to weeds in the document was just to illustrate the lack of attention the DES was getting from leadership. I was astonished to find the 2015 AR 15-6 report tasked the weeds for investigation (weeds are a simple task).

The Soldiers on detail clearing the weeds from DES the evening before your arrival is a testament to local management knowledge that something is lacking around here... I have never seen the station so weed-free. How you act when no one is watching is the key.

Hope this helps,

[REDACTED]
Senior Shift Language Specialist
Detrick Earth Station
301-619-8220
DSN: 343-8220

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] R CIV USARMY ARCYBER (USA)
Sent: Thursday, August 22, 2019 2:16 PM
To: [REDACTED] CIV USARMY 21 SIG BDE (USA)
<[REDACTED]@mail.mil>

Subject: DES Documentation (UNCLASSIFIED)

TABG

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

Mr [REDACTED]

Thank you for your time yesterday. I appreciate your input. Please feel free to send me any additional documentation that you feel is pertinent to discovery.

r/ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
DODIN Operations, Modernization Chief
G35, Future Operations (FUOPS) Cyber Planning
U. S. Army Cyber Command
8825 Beulah Street
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

[REDACTED]@mail.mil

[REDACTED]@mail.smil.mil

UNCLAS: 703-706-2558 (DSN: 235)

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED] R CIV USARMY ARCYBER (USA)

TABG

From: [REDACTED] CIV USARMY 21 SIG BDE (USA)
Sent: Sunday, August 25, 2019 9:51 AM
To: [REDACTED] CIV USARMY ARCYBER (USA)
Subject: Configuration Control Board for DES Scheduled for 4-5 September -- Critical Deadline 16 September (UNCLASSIFIED)
Signed By: [REDACTED] civ@mail.mil
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

Ms. [REDACTED],

I have just learned some interesting news!

This reminds me very much of the Soldiers working hard to pull the weeds around the station on the evening before your arrival (I have never seen the front of the DES building so weeds-free. They are still weeds around the antenna pedestals).

Things happen when being watched from above.

Configuration Control Board (CCB) meeting is scheduled for 4-5 September!

I am not entirely sure, but I believe the last one was held in 2011. You may, of course, already be aware of this.

As I understand, NETCOM directed the 302d Signal Battalion to begin such regular CCB meetings in early 2016, as a result of the AR 15-6 investigation initiated to answer the concerns I expressed to MG [REDACTED] in October 2015.

The CCB allows stakeholders to make contact with each other while all concerned are present. Interaction is the key. That might prevent a situation where only one party consents to a major station revision, like new antennas or reconfiguration (remote operation without external oversight and no RMF).

I can only present my view, but I believe it would be very beneficial to your investigation and to the Secretary of Defense if you could attend the CCB as an observer. If you cannot attend, I would highly recommend you notify your point of contact at the Office of the Secretary of Defense and maybe someone from OSD can be present to observe and/or take notes.

The level of expertise at the CCB will likely be minimal. After about eight years without one, there has likely been some generational change. I heard at the DISA person who would most likely run the board has abruptly quit. Mr. [REDACTED], former civilian deputy to the 21st Signal Brigade commander, was queried (by Mr. [REDACTED]) about the CCB in, I believe,

2014 when Mr. [REDACTED] was newly hired. Mr. [REDACTED] said he had seen the CCB as part of his job description in USAJOBS, but he knew absolutely nothing about it. I believe Mr. [REDACTED] has been replaced by Mr. [REDACTED]. Mr. George [REDACTED], formerly of DES Honeywell and now a GS-12 Army civilian here, will be present.

I was told the meeting will be held in the Gateway Telecommunications Center (GTC - across the street from DES) conference room. The GTC 24/7 number is (301) 619-8220.

CRITICAL DEADLINE: DES B Side antenna demolition is set to begin on 16 September. I am sending separately information on the antenna replacement. The antenna replacement is being driven by the same individuals who have failed -- in my view -- almost completely to effectively manage and operate Detrick Earth Station. Those individuals have been proven wrong in the past -- such as in the case of willful violation of AR 11-6, denying Defense Language Proficiency Testing and Foreign Language Proficiency Pay to GS-1040 Language Specialists -- proven wrong by a complete reversal of policy and the eventual (took two years, eight months after NETCOM instruction) payment to me (me only, not the other linguists) of \$7400 in back pay. The 2008 Information Assurance plan is another example of attention to detail by management.

I believe the antenna demolition should be put on hold until the Secretary of Defense investigation is complete. If it were halted, the simple phone call to put it on hold could turn out to be easily worth \$3-4 million. I've never made a \$4 million phone call myself, but it sounds taxpayer-friendly.

My view, shared by others, is that the Army has ignored the simplest and best option of antenna refurbishment and is spending \$3 to 4 million over refurbishment cost to replace our reliable and robust antenna system with unneeded dual-band antennas (who tells the President to get off the phone when the Army borrows one for another mission?). The engineers (who are in effect "selling" the system) have already failed at least three times: once by wrongly estimating pedestal height for the new smaller antennas; another in calculating power consumption, and the third in not thinking of the requirement for a massive and expensive new UPS system (current one is way too small). The current antennas could probably go another 15 years (remember - one geostationary satellite) with just a ~\$600,000 refurbishment -- and that could be done over time. The contractor appears (in my view) to have done a bait-and-switch on the costs, especially with the UPS and pedestal requirements. Several individuals I have consulted are concerned that the smaller antennas will not punch through precipitation with the low look angle we have to reach the Russian AM44 satellite. The extreme angle means that at times the signal path goes through extensive horizontal precipitation, not just a straight shot up. Storms out over the Atlantic can impact our signal, while we have no rain at the station. Solid clouds from here to the coast are a multiplier. The extra-large 15-meter C-Band antennas currently in place have proven almost perfect for the mission (we still suffer signal loss through rain fade, but only rarely complete loss, and then only for a few seconds).

It will be a great disappointment to all if we have to tell our Commander-in-Chief that he cannot call the Russian Federation because it is raining. Mr. [REDACTED] has even expressed doubt as to whether the engineers are right about the new antenna capabilities.

TAB 6

The basic story I get is "the Army needs new toys; contractors need to sell things." The Army plan that I have heard is to be able to use one of the antennas for different missions -- which shows a lack of understanding of the redundancy of our no-fail, five-nines, mission-critical Presidential Hotline system. Loss of redundancy is a HAZCON.

Please note that the results of the 2015 AR 15-6 -- please review! -- justified my concerns. The problem is the report was poorly written, the investigation was poorly executed, and the remedies were for the most part not realized. There are three strands of barbed wire over the turnstile.

I was right then. Now I am saying -- someone please take some time to look at the antenna replacement.

I was told by the Office of the Special Counsel (OSC) that SecDef has a 5 September deadline to report back to OSC. I was also informed that those deadlines are routinely extended.

I wish to conclude the investigation as rapidly as possible, but please understand that wrapping up a five-year ordeal in just a few days is probably not practical. I do not believe I am in any way responsible for delays caused by the Battalion or NETCOM (I was told by NETCOM in 2016 to "wait for the dust to settle" with no timeline) or by OSC (862 days to request an investigation). It took the Battalion two years and eight months to get me my back pay -- after NETCOM instructed them to do it. And basically, I got it myself by forcing the S3 and CPAC to go through the JAG, with the assistance of COL [REDACTED], 21st Signal Brigade commander. So - the Battalion did not really comply with the NETCOM instruction.

I am reminded that I was promised an unlimited-duration investigation by MG [REDACTED], for which NETCOM then allotted 15 days and then the officer investigated the situation at Fort Detrick while never leaving Fort Huachuca.

I will provide information on the antennas via separate email.

As a long-time Russia expert for the Department of Defense, I see a clear need for Detrick Earth Station. I remain optimistic. I am saving all correspondence and documentation for forwarding to Congress if the Secretary of Defense investigation concludes in similar fashion to the 2015 investigation. After the 862 days, I have given up on the OSC.


With politics in Washington, just imagine the reaction from Congress when they hear the Army has plugged a Russian satellite into a Secret-level communications facility! -- When there is a purpose-built isolated facility to house the Russian equipment right across the street, already funded and with personnel allotted. Right or wrong, it should make some interesting

headlines.

I will also provide information on jack-retasking and Dell computers via separate email.

Sorry to add so much to your reading list!

V/R


Senior Shift Language Specialist
Detrick Earth Station
301-619-8220
DSN: 343-8220

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

TABG

R CIV USARMY ARCYBER (USA)

From: [REDACTED] CIV USARMY 21 SIG BDE (USA)
Sent: Sunday, August 25, 2019 3:16 PM
To: [REDACTED] R CIV USARMY ARCYBER (USA)
Subject: Background Documents on DES Antenna Replacement (UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO)
Attachments: DCL+EOL+Study+Final+Report+080514+PBB.DOCX; DES End of Life Study Final Report DCL+EOL+presentation+080514+PB.PPTX
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Ms. [REDACTED],

I spent ten years as a military intelligence analyst trying to predict the future for EUCOM.

I became quite skilled at absorbing information from a variety of sources and producing courses of action or predicting potential outcomes. For a couple of years, I was even the author of the final version of the EUCOM Strategy for Active Security (as chief of the Transnational Threats Branch).

Evaluating, analyzing, and presenting conclusions was basically my job.

Our primary mission here at Detrick Earth Station (DES) is limited but extremely important: crisis communications with the Russian Federation. On 9/11, as reported in the press, we were the only communications link remaining after alternate paths were cut when the towers collapsed (with both superpowers on edge wondering if anyone would pull a nuclear trigger). That was a serious event. The mission of DES is to be ready for the next time.

In 2014, I carefully reviewed the End of Life Survey documentation for the DES antennas. This was *not* my job, but I do work at Detrick Earth Station and I was interested. I spoke to several technicians involved. I almost immediately concluded, "That's it then. We're going to refurbish the existing antennas." The other options were costly and provided capabilities beyond the scope of our mission -- our antennas are locked in to support the President and the redundancy requirement means we're not going to be using them for other outside missions.

Refurbishment of the existing C-Band antennas was the least expensive and the least disruptive to our mission-critical operations. DES has a simple mission using a geostationary satellite. Our antennas barely move. Other than a lightning strike in 2009 and some minor hail damage, they have proved themselves highly reliable.

I was very surprised this year to learn that the Army had opted for fancy new 9-meter MET-like terminals. The most expensive option.

Weekly Activity Report, July 31, 2019:

"U//FOUO): (Detrick Earth Station (DES) Antenna Replacement): The project to replace both DES 15-meter satellite antennas with new 9-meter antennas is expected to begin on 16 September 2019. The Tobyhanna civil work crew plans to begin the active phase of the project with the demolition of the B-Side antenna and followed by construction of the equipment shelter pad. The civil work is expected to be complete by 11 October. The GD-SATCOM contractor plans to move the new antenna on site and begin construction in December 2019. The projection is that the new antenna will be constructed and tested no later than April 2020. The Tobyhanna crew will return to Fort Detrick in May 2020 to repeat

email #4

the process on the A-Side antenna. The entire project will be completed before May of 2021. Mr. [REDACTED] of PM-WESS has assumed the role of project leader and Mr. [REDACTED] of USAISEC has assumed the role of project engineer."

We are kept in the dark by leadership. I have heard the new antennas will be dual-band. At this late date, I don't know. I have been told the Army wants antennas similar to the METs so the Soldiers will be working on almost-identical equipment (if DES was run as the Secretary of the Army intended, there would be NO SOLDIERS working in the DES compound). I have been told the Army wants antennas they can borrow to accommodate other real-world missions. None of those reasons should be applied to the Direct Communications Link. As I stated in an earlier email, we operate a redundant system here for a reason. If the Army borrows an antenna to support a Special Forces team downrange and then the President is using the other antenna and we have problems with that side of the system - which signal do we drop? The simple C-Band redundant 15-meter antennas we now have can be cheaply (in comparison) refurbished (see attached documents). The loss of the B-Side antenna as described above should result in a seven-month HAZCON due to loss of redundancy. During a time of unpredictable, but potential real-world conflicts.

One could say there are better and more in-the-know people than I who have approved the new antennas. *Some of them are the same ones who could not follow the instructions from NETCOM that arose from the 2015 AR 15-6*-- and got us where we are today. I would describe Detrick Earth Station today as operational, but ready to fail. If the right technicians aren't on a shift, the station is going down. It's a simple system and we have miraculously survived so far.

I have heard that the Army has long planned to bulldoze Bldg 1650 (DES) -- we were actually told that in 2013. I heard that one of the drivers behind that was the Army garrison policy of not being able to build any new buildings without getting rid of an old one. I am not sure the people who think that way are considering international relations and the potential to lower the risk of escalating a nuclear confrontation. That might not be found in the engineering handbooks.

General Dynamics recommending replacement over refurbishment is not unusual. What is the nature of their business? When I read the End of Life Survey documents, my impression was that General Dynamics knew we would go for refurbishment and the expensive options were just dreaming.

Maximum retrofit? Why not not-quite-maximum retrofit? There is no need to replace Bldg 1650 with a shelter or demolish the building. A \$120,000 replacement shelter is not needed. That is factored into the cost of refurbishment.

I overheard one discussion where the technicians had completely forgotten about providing room in the new antenna shelter to use and operate the orderwire. We are using a Russian Federation satellite. We chat with the Russians every shift. That had been overlooked. The technicians look at antennas and forget about the actual mission. We have ceremonial United States and Russian Federation flags in our building for a reason.

So far, I have heard that the engineers miscalculated the pedestal heights (\$\$\$), miscalculated power requirements (\$\$\$), and "forgot" the need for a super-large UPS (\$\$\$). I believe those were all discovered after the contract was signed. The potential that the antennas might not be able to handle atmospheric precipitation as well as our current 15-meter antennas is mentioned with dread.

I would think our old reliable antennas, with just light refurbishment and maintenance, should easily meet the mission through 2030. Technicians have agreed with me on that.

I walk around those antennas every day at work. I have heard many complaints from the technicians about the new METs across the street.

Has this battle been lost? Just delay 60 days while we figure out if the Direct Communications Link is even authorized to operate under RMF. If the station is entirely closed, we won't need any antennas at all.

In late 2013, we learned our frequency authorizations had expired in 2011. Didn't surprise me, because I had seen a lot in my first months here. To this day, I don't know if the authorizations have been renewed or not.

V/R

TABG

Senior Shift Language Specialist
Detrick Earth Station
301-619-8220
DSN: 343-8220

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

TABG

CIV USARMY ARCYBER (USA)

From: [REDACTED] CIV USARMY 21 SIG BDE (USA)
Sent: Sunday, August 25, 2019 4:06 PM
To: [REDACTED] CIV USARMY ARCYBER (USA)
Subject: Recommended Interviews (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

Ms. [REDACTED],

I highly recommend that you interview the following individuals in regard to your investigation:

Mr. [REDACTED] -- former Honeywell senior linguist. GS-12 Language Specialist. Over 30 years at Detrick Earth Station. Relied on for his corporate knowledge. [REDACTED] will be attending the CCB on Fort Detrick 4-5 September.

[REDACTED] CIV, 21 SIG BDE [REDACTED] civ@mail.mil (301) 619-8220 /
Cell: (301) 454-9815

Mr. [REDACTED] -- GS-12 SATCOM technician. One of the two "surviving" DES civilian technicians. DES is a cushy job with Washington, D.C. locality pay.

Explicitly, out of eight technicians originally hired to work DES, we have only two remaining. I believe Mr. [REDACTED] knows why. He wrote the (never-seen, disappeared, never-mentioned) report on the blown \$54,000 HPA. You'd think when we lose a piece of gear like that they would do an after-action brief so it doesn't happen again. Mr. [REDACTED] was not the cause of the failure, I heard that he was tasked to write the report. Mr. [REDACTED] was present during the failed ASI in December 2015 when we could not transfer circuits from A to B side, a situation not resolved for five months (an undeclared HAZCON).

[REDACTED] L CIV USARMY 21 SIG BDE [REDACTED] civ@mail.mil (301)
619-8220

Overseas:

Mr. [REDACTED] -- GS-12 SATCOM technician, retired Army SATCOM specialist. He knows Detrick Earth Station inside out. I worked with [REDACTED] from 2013-2015. He departed in September 2015 for Okinawa and I wrote my original disclosure to MG [REDACTED] a month later. As I'm sure you're aware, Okinawa is 13 hours ahead of us; he is most easily reachable in the evening here as he starts his day over there.

[REDACTED] J CIV USARMY 516 SIG BDE [REDACTED] civ@mail.mil Node Site Coordinator, 516th Signal Brigade
(098) 970-9464 (Work)
DSN 315-645-9464
08091915907 (Cell)

Potential interview:

Mr. [REDACTED] -- GS-11 SATCOM technician, [REDACTED] was another DES Honeywell employee who was hired as an Army civilian in 2013. He knows the history and could provide another view. He is former Air Force. He is the other

surviving DES technician, along with Mr. [REDACTED]. He hopes to retire soon and I have no idea why he has not been promoted (must have something to do with management).

[REDACTED] CIV (US) [REDACTED] .civ@mail.mil (301) 619-8220

Hope this helps,

[REDACTED]
Senior Shift Language Specialist
Detrick Earth Station
301-619-8220
DSN: 343-8220

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

██████████ R CIV USARMY ARCYBER (USA)

TABG

From: ██████████ CIV USARMY 21 SIG BDE (USA)
Sent: Sunday, August 25, 2019 7:05 PM
To: ██████████ R CIV USARMY ARCYBER (USA)
Subject: DES Information Assurance Plan (UNCLASSIFIED)
Attachments: DCL IA Plan HIGHLIGHTED VERSION.PDF; DCL IA Plan CURRENT PLAN AS OF 20190825.doc; DCL_DIACAP_SIP.XLS; DoDI 8500.01_2014 EXTRACT.JPG

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

Ms. ██████████

The 302d Signal Battalion was tasked by NETCOM with accomplishing a "full DIACAP review" in early 2016 (recommended action in the AR 15-6 report of investigation). A lieutenant colonel at NETCOM told me the Battalion would have 30 days to report completion of the AR 15-6 tasks. I think that was March 2016.

I believe leadership has knowingly, willfully, and negligently placed at risk DoD information by not ensuring implementation of the DoD security requirements in DoD 8500.01, March 14, 2014 (see attached extract in .jpg format). How else can it be explained?

Bottom line: The Army took over Honeywell operations in 2013 without having any plan whatsoever. At a minimum, the Honeywell contract (statement of work) should have been converted into an Army SOP or some kind of program plan. The IA Plan should have been immediately updated and kept current.

NOTES on the attached "current and in force" DCL IA Plan from 21 March 2008:

As you saw when you visited, the DCL/DES building was full of Soldiers. In total disregard for the IA Plan, leadership first moved the Supply section into the DES building in early 2013. That brings anybody and everybody into the building and most Brigade-and-below personnel seem to have badges that are programmed to allow entry. This year, the Company (Activity) moved its headquarters into the building when their building's roof caved in. One of the Soldiers who cleared the weeds from the front of the building the evening prior to your arrival was being punished -- AND I was told he was also on suicide watch. Mr. ██████████ later found the Soldier taking a break in the DES kitchen. I have entered the building on a weekend and found a Soldier being punished cleaning the DES kitchen -- with no one else in the building. So, contrary to the IA Plan, disgruntled Soldiers can be ordered to spend time with the Presidential Hotline. Is there a problem with that? In the early days of DES, the four of us on a duty shift carefully monitored and escorted all who entered and exited. With 24/7 three-person minimum manning and a buzzer that rings when the turnstile moves, it was fairly easy.

To my knowledge, no one has ever found the DIACAP DAA letter of concurrence. This was mentioned in the 2015 AR 15-6 report of investigation.

Configuration changes were made to DES configuration (remote operations) without informing anyone -- to my knowledge. It was joked about as "under cover of darkness."

I cannot name the current DES station manager, if there is one. I just asked the shift leader (Mr. ██████████) for a copy of the DES SOP and the DES or FES Security Plan. He said to his knowledge there are no such documents. Of course, I already knew that.

In 2013, we had a 10-to-15-second response time to alarms or other issues. The IA Plan claims maintenance support is available 24/7 *immediately upon failure.* We now have all so-called DES personnel working out of the GTC, which is actually more than three hundred yards away (counting the hallway inside the building which you must travel to get to Mission Control). In recent weeks, we have had alarms that are audible ONLY at the DES -- they are not being heard in the GTC. This has been reported. We went from a response time countable in seconds to "someone will get there eventually."

"The DCL conducts an annual IA review..." -- Who is accountable for that?

There has been no CCB to my knowledge since about 2011. Then, surprise! Scheduled for 4-5 September when under investigation. I can just hear the old military pencil-whipping: "We just had one, sir!"

"Changes ... are assessed for IA and accreditation impact prior to implementation." Who is accountable? We altered the system and moved part of it and the personnel across the street.

The site has a System Security Plan. I have searched for it for over six years and never found one. The FES out back (which might or might not be TS) has none. The FES has been under power for a couple of years for no apparent reason. I think it's empty, but I've never been briefed/trained/or told anything about it -- other than the door cypher code. I am responsible for checking it inside and out at least once during my shift.

"...only authorized personnel with a need-to-know are granted physical access to the DCL..." -- Sounds like we should be protecting the Presidential Hotline the way the "nuclear football" (launch codes) is protected.

The 24/7 shifts at DES ceased in September 2015 and we were ordered to visit the building "only upon dispatch."

I have never received any training on environmental controls. DPW has no regular maintenance agreement for the DES, so we just wait for things to break. The DES building humidifier was faulting out for over five years before a DPW HVAC technician finally checked it out and found a faulty switch in the ceiling.

The "detailed visitor log" does not account for people who don't sign in and out on it. With the Supply section in the building, we have a fairly constant stream of visitors.

"Maintenance is only performed by authorized personnel" -- nope, just whoever is available. Civilian technicians are self-certified. I believe that's how we lost an \$54,000 HPA.

"...assigned IA responsibilities..." What assigned IA responsibilities?

"Physical relocation or changes to the configuration...of equipment are specifically prohibited..." Let's move the orderwire over to the GTC!

The System Identification Profile is a major part of the problem.

We had meticulously monitored Cell Watch software on a laptop computer to track the status of the UPS until the software stopped working about a year ago -- now we ignore it.

I believe a power cut-off switch is required on the operations floor -- there is none. You'd have to run back into the UPS room to cut power.


The security cameras have gone down for weeks (when replacing faulty electronics under warranty) so we have no video feeds over at the GTC. We do not change any security procedures to meet the lack of video coverage. The monitors are mostly ignored anyway, so it doesn't make much difference.

TAB 6

I long ago gave up on getting government-procured working flashlights for the DES. I purchase my own, which I try to always carry with me. The Honeywell-era orange rechargeable flashlights on the operations floor only emit light when plugged in. The internal non-replaceable batteries died many years ago. I guess they would work with a long extension cord. We bring this to the attention of management every so often, as we have since 2013. I already said that I purchased my own personal flashlight. I also provide the mechanical pencils we use for our clipboard checklist -- I gave up on trying to get government-issued pencils, too. The Supply section is in the building, but that doesn't mean it functions.

The System Information Profile: As I have explained to NETCOM and the Office of the Special Counsel, DES was improperly classified as "mission essential" vs "mission critical." That misclassification generated some of the IA control codes. I have no idea how someone with any knowledge of the Cuban Missile Crisis could classify DES as only mission essential. The current "Company" commander (we currently have a first lieutenant in charge of the DES in its role as the primary satellite component of the Presidential Hotline) has called the Hotline the "hot link." I think that is a sausage.

Hope this helps,


Senior Shift Language Specialist
Detrick Earth Station
301-619-8220
DSN: 343-8220

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

██████████ CIV USARMY ARCYBER (USA)

TABG

From: ██████████ CIV USARMY 21 SIG BDE (USA)
Sent: Wednesday, August 28, 2019 1:14 PM
To: ██████████ R CIV USARMY ARCYBER (USA)
Subject: ██████████ 2016 Email Trail FW: Monday (UNCLASSIFIED)
Attachments: Memo for MAJ ██████████.pdf

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Ms. ██████████

FYI -- I ran across this and decided to forward so you could see an attempt for resolution at lower levels.

The email trail below reflects my efforts to work through 21st Sig Bde prior to contacting the Office of the Special Counsel in February 2017. COL ██████████ did assist me by at least adding her name to the issue of back foreign language proficiency pay (still took 2 yrs, 8 mos). We met in the DES conference room for about 45 minutes and she said she would obtain a copy of the AR 15-6 Report of Investigation from then NETCOM Chief of Staff COL ██████████. I would have to obtain one via FOIA. No one has ever informed me of any results of that investigation.

There were two attachments to this email trail (the document I sent to MG ██████████ in Oct 2015 -- which you already have, and the AR 15-6 appointment memorandum -- attached).

Nothing really happened after the meeting with COL ██████████. I once ran into her on the sidewalk and she asked me who a good POC would be to initiate a CCB. I advised that her civilian deputy (Mr. Scott ██████████) should know, as he would be a member.

COL ██████████ has since retired. I considered that I had exhausted local remedies if meeting with the 21st Sig Bde commander brought no results. I contacted OSC in Feb 2017 and they took 862 days to refer my disclosure for investigation. Imagine waiting day by day and week by week for that long, expecting some resolution...

I unfortunately still have more documents to send. I know you wish to put this matter behind you, as do I.

Hope this gives you another piece of the picture.

██████████
Senior Shift Language Specialist
Detrick Earth Station
301-619-8220
DSN: 343-8220

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

-----Original Message-----

From: ██████████ CIV USARMY 21 SIG BDE (US)
Sent: Thursday, September 1, 2016 7:48 AM
To: ██████████ CIV USARMY 21 SIG BDE (US) <██████████.civ@mail.mil>
Subject: Re: Monday (UNCLASSIFIED)

I'll be there in about 15 min!

Sent from my iPhone

> On Sep 1, 2016, at 7:47 AM, Thrasher, Jon W CIV USARMY 21 SIG BDE (US) <jon.w.thrasher.civ@mail.mil> wrote:

>

> CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

>

> DES is best for me.

>

> -----Original Message-----

> From: [REDACTED] COL USARMY 21 SIG BDE (US)

> Sent: Thursday, September 01, 2016 7:46 AM

> To: [REDACTED] CIV USARMY 21 SIG BDE (US) <[REDACTED]@mail.mil>

> Subject: Re: Monday (UNCLASSIFIED)

>

> Finished PT, heading to grab coffee.

>

> Can meet at PX or DES. What is best for you?

>

> Sent from my iPhone

>

>> On Sep 1, 2016, at 6:20 AM, [REDACTED] CIV USARMY 21 SIG BDE (US) <[REDACTED]@mail.mil> wrote:

>>

>> CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

>>

>> I am at your disposal -- I just noticed the garrison run was canx.

>>

>> -----Original Message-----

>> From: [REDACTED] COL USARMY 21 SIG BDE (US)

>> Sent: Monday, August 29, 2016 5:47 PM

>> To: [REDACTED] CIV USARMY 21 SIG BDE (US) <[REDACTED]@mail.mil>

>> Subject: RE: Monday (UNCLASSIFIED)

>>

>> CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

>>

>> Mr [REDACTED]

>> Sorry but can we move the meeting to 8:30 (now we have a garrison run) and this would allow me to support that and meet you.

>>

>> COL [REDACTED]

>>

>> -----Original Message-----

>> From: [REDACTED] CIV USARMY 21 SIG BDE (US)

>> Sent: Sunday, August 28, 2016 4:07 PM

>> To: [REDACTED] COL USARMY 21 SIG BDE (US) <[REDACTED]@mail.mil>

>> Subject: RE: Monday (UNCLASSIFIED)

>>

>> CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

>>

>> 0630 Thursday -- I will be here at DES.

>>

>> Thanks again!

TABG

>>
>> [REDACTED]
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: [REDACTED] COL USARMY 21 SIG BDE (US)
>> Sent: Sunday, August 28, 2016 4:04 PM
>> To: [REDACTED] CIV USARMY 21 SIG BDE (US) <[REDACTED].civ@mail.mil>
>> Subject: RE: Monday (UNCLASSIFIED)

>>
>> CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
>>
>> Deconflicting the schedule seems to be the hardest part!
>>
>> I have PT at 7 so how about 6:30 Thursday?
>>
>> I know that there are things that must be fixed and thank you for the suspense to COL [REDACTED] I was not aware of that.. agree that might get us started.
>>
>> You can definitely raise this to a higher level and I do appreciate the opportunity to figure out where we are now and where we need to go first. You did not have to do that!
>> I'll at least know what work was recommended and what work was not found lacking.

>>
>> COL [REDACTED]
>>
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: [REDACTED] CIV USARMY 21 SIG BDE (US)
>> Sent: Sunday, August 28, 2016 4:00 PM
>> To: [REDACTED] J COL USARMY 21 SIG BDE (US) <[REDACTED]mil@mail.mil>
>> Subject: RE: Monday (UNCLASSIFIED)

>>
>> CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
>>
>> Thanks, COL [REDACTED]
>>
>> I have the utmost respect for your busy schedule!
>>
>> I am off Wednesday, but Thu-Fri anytime from 0600-0745 at the DES should be perfect for me. Would you be available then?
>>
>> As long as we have two linguists on shift, I can leave the DES/GTC. If my colleague takes a sick day, I am stuck on the Russian orderwire due to minimum manning.
>>
>> This is a learning process, as usual. The AR 15-6 investigation was probably the wrong vehicle for the journey.
>>
>> The original completed ROI should be at the NETCOM Office of the Staff Judge Advocate. COL [REDACTED] may have retained a copy. NETCOM was the "agency" that undertook the investigation. That said, my latest research indicates that I can only get a [redacted] copy through FOIA. I will request one.

>>
>> I could ask COL [REDACTED] for a summary of results and outcome, but there may be a shortcut:
>>

>> I was informed by LTC [REDACTED] (7th Sig Cmd/JAG) in late March that LTC [REDACTED] received a task list with a 30 April suspense. The task list was generated by ROI recommendations.

>>

>> So would not LTC [REDACTED] know the results and outcome of the investigation in the form of those tasks? -- If not for my enlightenment, then for your awareness.

>>

>> Fire suppression was apparently not an ROI-generated task assigned to Battalion -- no change at DES since last September. So I assume it was unsubstantiated. Our unmanned fire extinguishers are good enough for the no-fail missions at DES. (I spoke a few months ago to the FES Program Manager, Mr. [REDACTED] and he said Mr. [REDACTED] will not directly answer the question of 24/7 fire suppression for that project either)

>>

>> If my concern over the lack of fire suppression was unsubstantiated in the final report, I will definitely try for a second opinion.

>>

>> The same goes for cybersecurity. A coworker witnessed how that was "investigated." I worked cybersecurity for EUCOM J2.

>>

>> So everything points to Office of Special Counsel as the next step. OSC will hand it back to Army, but at least it should get a higher level of review.

>>

>> Another year will then go by and I'll retire, knowing I tried.

>>

>> Thanks again for your time! We can fix this. Or we can convince me that nothing needs fixing... :)

>>

>> Best regards,

>>

>> [REDACTED]

>> Senior Shift Language Specialist

>> Detrick Earth Station

>> 301-619-7411

>> DSN: 343-7411

>>

>>

>>

>> -----Original Message-----

>> From: [REDACTED] COL USARMY 21 SIG BDE (US)

>> Sent: Sunday, August 28, 2016 10:03 AM

>> To: [REDACTED] CIV USARMY 21 SIG BDE (US) <[REDACTED]civ@mail.mil>

>> Subject: RE: Monday (UNCLASSIFIED)

>>

>> CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

>>

>> Mr [REDACTED]

>> Sorry for the delay...It took some time to get some guidance.

>> What I have been told by the 7th IG, who I asked very limited question so as not to violate your trust, is that the next steps for you are to ask the agency who you submitted the original concern to for the results and outcome of the investigation/inquiry.

>>

>> Our schedules are off but we can meet Wed (31st) to discuss. A good time for me would be 0745 before the day gets too crazy.

>>

>> Tell me where you can meet and if that time works.

TABG

>>
>> COL [REDACTED]
>>
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: [REDACTED] CIV USARMY 21 SIG BDE (US)
>> Sent: Saturday, August 27, 2016 4:45 PM
>> To: [REDACTED] J COL USARMY 21 SIG BDE (US) <[REDACTED].mil@mail.mil>
>> Subject: RE: Monday (UNCLASSIFIED)

>>
>> CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
>>

>> COL [REDACTED]
>>
>> Haven't heard from you on this. Are you still interesting in meeting? My home phone is 717-321-3316.
>>
>> I work tomorrow (Sunday) from 0545-1800 hours. DES/Bldg 1650 should be available and unoccupied all day (except for me doing facility checks).
>>
>> Unfortunately, my schedule has been modified to cover for another shift and I am off Mon-Tue-Wed. I work shift Thu-Fri.
>>
>> Once again, I am primarily interested in obtaining a copy of the AR 15-6 ROI.

>> [REDACTED]
>>
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: [REDACTED] W CIV USARMY 21 SIG BDE (US)
>> Sent: Friday, August 19, 2016 7:00 AM
>> To: [REDACTED] J COL USARMY 21 SIG BDE (US) <[REDACTED].mil@mail.mil>
>> Subject: Monday (UNCLASSIFIED)

>>
>> CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
>>
>> I will be available Monday and Tuesday from 0530-1800 HRS.
>>
>> Typically, I'm the only person at DES from 0530-0730 and 1700-1745. Supply personnel are in and out of the building from ~0800-1700. I spend most of my day at the GTC.
>>
>> There are two of us linguists scheduled to work Mon-Tue, so I can break away at any time if you would like me to stop by your office.
>>
>> [REDACTED]
>> Senior Shift Language Specialist
>> Detrick Earth Station
>> 301-619-7411
>> DSN: 343-7411

>>

>> -----Original Message-----

>> From: [REDACTED] COL USARMY 21 SIG BDE (US)

>> Sent: Thursday, August 18, 2016 6:42 PM

>> To: Thrasher, Jon W CIV USARMY 21 SIG BDE (US) <jon.w.thrasher.civ@mail.mil>

>> Subject: Re: DES -- FYSA // Display in HTML if possible // (UNCLASSIFIED)

>>

>> Okay sounds like Mon.

>>

>> How late/early would work?

>>

>> Sent from my iPhone

>>

>>> On Aug 18, 2016, at 6:09 AM, [REDACTED] CIV USARMY 21 SIG BDE (US) <[REDACTED]civ@mail.mil> wrote:

>>>

>>> CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

>>>

>>> COL [REDACTED],

>>>

>>> Sorry so slow to reply -- shiftwork: I was off Mon-Tue-Wed. I don't often check work email from home.

>>>

>>> My schedule is day shift today and Friday, then off Sat & Sun; back on day shift Mon and Tuesday.

>>>

>>> Tomorrow/Friday for half the shift I will be the only linguist on duty, so I cannot leave the DES/GTC during those hours due to minimum manning.

>>>

>>> Monday or Tuesday seem to fit our schedules best. We should have two linguists on shift then, so I can be available anytime.

>>>

>>> I would recommend the DES conference room as a meeting place, if possible. It's very quiet (if the FES team is not there). Seeing some of the limitations firsthand is much better than any written version.

>>>

>>> I appreciate your time and response. Thanks!

>>>

>>> Very respectfully,

>>>

>>> [REDACTED]

>>>

>>>

>>>

>>> -----Original Message-----

>>> From: [REDACTED] COL USARMY 21 SIG BDE (US)

>>> Sent: Sunday, August 14, 2016 6:29 PM

>>> To: [REDACTED] CIV USARMY 21 SIG BDE (US) <[REDACTED]civ@mail.mil>

>>> Subject: Re: DES -- FYSA // Display in HTML if possible // (UNCLASSIFIED)

>>>

>>> [REDACTED]

>>> Thank you so much for taking the time to write this detailed and clearly concerning email. Do you have time for either a phone call or office visit soon?

>>>

>>> I'm in the office Mon but traveling the rest of the week but hope we can make time for your issues and determine a way forward.

>>>

>>> I want you to know you can trust your information will remain protected until we decide on a plan.

TABG

>>>

>>>

> Sent from my iPhone

>>>

>>> On Aug 14, 2016, at 5:46 PM, [REDACTED] CIV USARMY 21 SIG BDE (US) <[REDACTED].civ@mail.mil

<mailto:[REDACTED].civ@mail.mil> > wrote:

>>>

>>>

>>>

>>> CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

>>>

>>>

>>> Colonel [REDACTED],

>>>

>>>

>>>

>>> During the recent Detrick Earth Station (DES) overview brief, you said you were looking for issues that you might be able to address as the new Brigade commander. I provide the following in response and for your situational awareness.

>>>

>>>

>>>

>>> On 16 October 2015, I sent MG [REDACTED] (with cc: to 7th Sig Cmd IG) an overview of concerns I had regarding our operation of Detrick Earth Station (DES) and the Presidential Direct Communications Link (DCL) (and other national-level circuits).

>>>

>

>>>

>>> A day or so later, after some negotiation with MG [REDACTED] through the 7th Sig Cmd JA office, I agreed that an AR 15-6 investigation carried out by NETCOM should be able to provide resolution at the lowest level. MG [REDACTED] was the authorizing official for DES cybersecurity accreditation, so he nobly decided to elevate the issue to NETCOM, in effect recusing himself and 7th Sig Cmd from self-investigation.

>>>

>>>

>>>

>>> 7th Sig Cmd JA then informed me that a NETCOM investigating officer would soon arrive on an unlimited-duration TDY and conduct a thorough investigation. In December the investigating officer, MAJ [REDACTED] (NETCOM), made contact with me via email. Several telephone conversations with him followed.

>>>

>>>

>>>

>>> MAJ [REDACTED] did not travel to Fort Detrick for the investigation. To my knowledge, none of the technicians or linguists assigned to DES were interviewed. I highly recommended that Mr. [REDACTED] be interviewed, as his technical knowledge of station operations far exceeds my expertise. He was not.

>>>

>>>

>>>

>>> Roughly ten months have passed since I contacted MG [REDACTED]. The only evidence I have seen of any remedial or corrective action is:

>

>>>

>>>

>>> * Three strands of barbed wire added to DES turnstile (took us three years)
>>>
>>> * FES relocated from GTC to DES compound (excellent!)
>>>
>>> * Installation of a commercial-off-the-shelf motion detection system in the DES (a non-solution, in my view)
>>>
>>> Several issues appear to be unresolved.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> To address those issues, I am now preparing to make a protected communication to the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) - folding in the material I sent MG [REDACTED] last October and adding in some follow-up issues/information.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I am attaching the investigating officer appointment memorandum, dated 15 November 2015, as a reference.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I am attaching my communication to MG [REDACTED] dated 16 October 2015, as a reference. Embedded documents in the Word .doc contain important information.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I would be highly surprised to learn you were unaware of the investigation.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> 7th Sig Cmd JA office did inform me that LTC [REDACTED] was given a post-investigation task list for completion by 30 April. I recommend that you touch base with her for further details, if interested.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I also highly recommend that you contact your old acquaintance, Mr. [REDACTED]. He was an eyewitness for many of the issues that I raised with MG [REDACTED]. At times [REDACTED] can be reluctant to "make waves," but he knows the subject well. He's only been gone a year and may return in 2017.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> So far, under the toxic CO/BN civilian management, four DES technicians and one language specialist have "quit." That's an *amazing trend* considering the locality pay.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I do have one favor to ask:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I request your assistance in obtaining a copy of the AR 15-6 report of investigation (ROI). Access to the ROI would allow me to better tailor my OSC submission to fit the current situation. If not possible, I will FOIA it - as an insider, it seems like I should have access.
>>>

TAB 6

>>>

>>>

>>> My 7th Sig Cmd POC was LTC (then-MAJ) [REDACTED]. She has not answered repeated emails and appears to have moved on to MEDCOM. She has not followed up since the last time I spoke to her by telephone and requested a copy of the ROI.

>>>

>>>

>>>

>>> MG [REDACTED] has moved on.

>>>

>>>

>>>

>>> DES is still here.

>>>

>>>

>>>

>>> I respectfully request that my communication to MG [REDACTED] not receive wide dissemination. Local reprisal has already occurred - in my view. I consider this a protected communication.

>>>

>>>

>>>

>>> I stand ready to assist in any way I can, but at this point OSC looks like the solution.

>>>

>>>

>>>

>>> Very respectfully,

>

>>>

>>>

>>> [REDACTED]

>>>

>>> Senior Shift Language Specialist

>>>

>>> Detrick Earth Station

>>>

>>>

>>>

>>> 301-619-7411

>>>

>>>

>>>

>>>

>>>

>>>

>>> CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

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>>> <mime-attachment>

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>>> <mime-attachment>

>

>>> <Memo for MAJ [REDACTED].pdf>

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CIV USARMY ARCYBER (USA)

TAB G

From: [REDACTED] CIV USARMY 21 SIG BDE (USA)
Sent: Wednesday, August 28, 2019 6:46 PM
To: [REDACTED] CIV USARMY ARCYBER (USA)
Subject: DES and Toxic Leadership (UNCLASSIFIED)
Attachments: DES and Toxic Leadership.docx

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

Ms. [REDACTED],

Who is responsible? Some of my thoughts on that issue. I know you don't want to receive this, but we can't just tiptoe around it.

When the Cobra Ball crashed in 1981, we ended up burying 86 pounds of what remained of my supervisor, Harry Parsons. His name is on the They Served in Silence memorial at Fort Meade along with my good friend Steven Balcer. My last flight on that aircraft was on January 4th of that year; it crashed on March 15th.

The investigation showed lack of leadership and a "good old boy" program that led to inadequate training, six killed, and the loss of one of our finest reconnaissance aircraft (one of only two of its type). I later flew missions on its replacement.

See reflections of a "good old boy" program around here.

Has current leadership shown themselves worthy to continue the mission of support to the Washington-Moscow Hotline?

I seek no punishment for anyone, but the reward of continuing as before as if nothing happened should not be the outcome.

Hope this helps,

[REDACTED]
Senior Shift Language Specialist
Detrick Earth Station
301-619-8220
DSN: 343-8220

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

email #9
with attachment

302nd Signal Battalion – Toxic Leadership

TAB 6

I apologize for some conversational aspects of this. This is what I would say in an interview. In an interview, maybe only five or six lines of this would be written down to survive for the record.

I am an experienced DoD professional in my 42nd year of combined military and civilian duty.

I am a retired Air Force Senior Master Sergeant with 24 years of active duty.

For over half my Air Force career I served in special duty assignments with strict selection requirements. I was selected for special duty as an arms control attaché at US Embassy Moscow and served for over four years, later returning for temporary duty in the Defense Attaché Office and the Security Assistance Office.

I reached the top of my field as an Airborne Cryptologic Technician flying Cold War missions on RC-135 Cobra Ball and Rivet Joint aircraft. I was a Standards & Evaluations flight examiner and the top Russian-language military linguist in Electronic Security Alaska (Eielson and Elmendorf AFBs).

My awards and decorations include the Defense Meritorious Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters, the Air Force Meritorious Service Medal, the Air Force Commendation Medal, various Achievement Medals, and the Air Medal with three oak leaf clusters. I am authorized wear of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Badge. My first DMSM was awarded when I was a Technical Sergeant (E-6) – I was told some nearby officers were shocked and wanted to block it, but higher command overruled their objections. I was the first enlisted deputy team chief for the On-Site Inspection Agency, a position normally reserved for a major.

The Air Force MSM would have been my 4th DMSM, but the Air Force Board for the Correction of Military Records was not authorized to make a joint service award, so it was issued as an Air Force award. They just apologized instead. That's a long story – an Air Force colonel was stealing gasoline and I advised him to seek legal counsel. Legal counsel told him to stop stealing gasoline and then he fired me so he could continue stealing gasoline. Took three years for the DoD IG to hold him responsible (never even interviewed me or any other enlisted personnel with knowledge of events) and his retirement 28 days prior to the conclusion of the investigation meant that he would not be recalled to active duty for punishment as "his retirement is a mitigating circumstance." It then took another three years for the AFBCMR to "make me whole," which was not possible after such a passage of time (the AFBCMR itself called it "an unacceptably long time").

My third DMSM had been awarded to me by being pointed to on a table with the words, "I think you know what that is." Not much of a ceremony. Lonely are the brave.

While serving more than ten years as an intelligence professional with J2/EUCOM, I served as chief of the Joint Analysis Center Transnational Threats Branch and the Open Source Intelligence Branch (OSINT for all of EUCOM).

As a civilian, I was awarded the National Intelligence Meritorious Unit Citation as a member of an intelligence team credited with preventing a terrorist bombing in Germany.

I almost got to interpret for former Soviet President Gorbachev in 1995, but then-Senator Thomas Daschle, as a member of a Congressional delegation visiting Moscow, shied away from meeting him at an event held at the Ambassador's residence.

I achieved the grade of GG-14-equivalent under NSPS Pay Banding. After the collapse of NSPS, I accepted a voluntary downgrade to GG-13 instead of continuing service as a GG-14. I chose the downgrade to serve as chief of OSINT for EUCOM – mission first. I then accepted a voluntary downgrade to GS-12 (Step 10!) to return from overseas and be close to my son who has life-threatening medical issues and would be attending college in Pennsylvania. I remain eligible to apply for GS-15 positions (occasionally some arms control positions interest me).

I am familiar with the DoD IG and I have become familiar with the way both the DoD IG and the Army conduct investigations. I have heard that only 3% of cases are resolved in favor of the whistleblowers. I made that top 3% my first time through. I am familiar with the Quality Standards for Investigations written up by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.

I arrived at Fort Detrick expecting to possibly conclude an interesting career by supporting the Washington-Moscow Hotline. There was potential for travel to Russia. I had worked with the Soviets/Russians face-to-face for over 11 years in the Soviet Union, Russia, and in the United States. I was highly motivated to see a new part of the US-Russia relations story. I had always wanted to work the "Hotline," but I didn't want the commute to the Pentagon (my duties had brought me there occasionally from 1988-1992, so been-there, done-that).

I expected to be treated like a senior GS-12 (protocol equivalent of a major) at Fort Detrick.

I was rather shocked to find that the position at the Battalion was actually a position at the Company as a "squad member" with the duties of an apparently civilian equivalent of Army Private or Specialist.

- We were not hailed. As people became fed up, found other employment, and departed, the DES employees were also not fare-welled. None of us had been assigned Army sponsors – many were first-time-ever GS employees.
- As a GS-12, I expected to be scheduled for a courtesy call with the Battalion/Brigade commanders, as had been my experience at EUCOM. I was ready for it. Nothing. I met the Company commanders only by introducing *myself to them* on the rare occasions we crossed paths. I believe I have attended only one Company-level "sensing session" over my 6+ years of duty. The sensing sessions are the Army's way of forcing commanders to talk to their subordinates. Not very effective, in my experience.
- One of our DES employees, Mr. [REDACTED], received counseling from the Company commander for a harassment allegation in 2015. Afterward, Mr. [REDACTED] confided in me that he had no idea who the Company commander was – "Who was that guy?"
- I met Mr. [REDACTED], the Battalion GS-14, once in 2013. I approached him and introduced myself. He shook my hand and basically had nothing to say. I saw him possibly two or three times from 2013-2018, but never exchanged words. In 2018, he briefly occupied the conference room at the DES for some personnel work he was doing. I said hello and commented on the weather when either he or I exited and entered the building. He showed no interest in even knowing who I was. In my view, Mr. [REDACTED] is the most-responsible individual for the "decapitation and evisceration" of DES. He carefully leaves no written trails (the lack of an IA Plan, security plans, or SOPs are his unwritten record). I would estimate I have received a half dozen emails sent by him over my 6+ years at DES, none of which were addressed to me, just general distribution mailouts.
- The Soldiers have been wonderful overall. Soldiers respect experience and as a former senior noncommissioned officer it is easy to establish rapport with the troops.
- My performance reports were excellent here, as they have been since 1978, with the exception of the one after I contacted MG [REDACTED] in 2015. That one was downgraded a step (and they even forgot to change the support form to match!) and I lost half of my predictable annual cash award

TAB 6

that year. The paperwork equivalent of beating me up and stealing \$500. In my view, a warning shot.

- I was dismayed to see one of our major performance objectives at Fort Detrick was "fill out ATAAPS on time and without errors." I protested to "squad leaders" and they informed me that they thought it was stupid also, but Mr. [REDACTED], the Company civilian executive officer, wanted it, so we had to keep it. If the American public knew that a major performance objective for Army civilians was to fill out their time cards, I think people would start to doubt our competency. The performance objective remains to this very day under DPMAP: "ATAAPS labor reports will be error free and concurred with by the 2nd Thursday of each pay period at 1400." Filling out your time card is not an Army performance objective. It has been here since at least 2014.
- Mr. [REDACTED] was fully informed of the GS-1040 battle for language proficiency pay and testing in 2014. He was on the distro and never took any action that I am aware of. He exhibited no concern that his immediate subordinate, Mr. [REDACTED], was willfully in violation of AR 11-6 and overruled by NETCOM and later on the JAG. Do Mr. [REDACTED]'s performance reports reflect anything on that?
- Mr. [REDACTED] had to be a recipient of the instructions from NETCOM to fix the issues in the 2015 AR 15-6 report of investigation. **We are at this point today because of that lack of action.** The day I sent the "Decapitation and Evisceration" document to MG [REDACTED] Mr. [REDACTED] was called back into work *after duty hours that evening* to trace the connections from the Russian orderwire to the GTC (is he an expert in that?). I am positive he assured MG [REDACTED] that having the Russian Federation-connected equipment hooked into the secure facility was just fine. Mr. [REDACTED] I am also sure, did not travel to Russia to see what the computers on the other end are connected to at Vladimir and Dubna.
- If Mr. [REDACTED] and ten or a dozen similar-looking individuals were in a lineup at a Walmart, I would not be able to identify him from among them.
- Of course, shift work does mean that I spend half my time working nights. But then again, my place of work has been at most two buildings' distance from Mr. [REDACTED] for over six years. And I have done an awful lot of 12-hour day shifts. Walking across a street is not difficult on an Army post. The crosswalks are well marked and the drivers are courteous.
- It is my understanding that Mr. [REDACTED] was a company commander here, then a battalion commander, then after a tour or so away after retirement he wrote his own position description as Battalion "civilian executive officer." Toxic management may be the part of his heritage that remains here at Fort Detrick for future generations.

Should the individuals who have brought us to this point today be allowed to continue running the satellite component of the Washington-Moscow Hotline?

I agree with General Milley on toxic leadership.


In the Army's own words:

Army Regulation 600-100 [ANNOTATIONS IN RED]

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

MARK A. MILLEY
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:



GERALD B. O'KEEFE
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army

1-11. Core leader competencies, "toxic" leadership, and destructive leadership styles

a. To produce an Army of trusted professionals in cohesive teams who adapt and win in a complex world, the Army has identified core leader competencies that pertain to all levels of leadership, both military and civilian. Core leader competencies are related leader behaviors that **lead to successful performance**, are common throughout the organization, and are consistent with the organizational mission and the Army Ethic. Core leader competencies support the executive core competencies that Army Civilians are expected to master as they advance in their careers.

Performance has not been successful.

b. All Army leaders are responsible for demonstrating consistently, including online, the following core leader competencies that are described in detail in ADRP 6-22:

(1) *Leads others.* Leaders motivate, inspire, and influence others to take the initiative, work toward a common purpose, accomplish tasks, and achieve organizational objectives.

I could not pick Mr. [REDACTED] out of a lineup of similar-looking individuals.

(2) *Extends influence beyond the chain of command.* Leaders must extend their influence beyond direct lines of authority and chains of command. This influence may extend to Joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, and other groups, and helps shape perceptions about the organization.

When was the last CCB?

(3) *Leads by example.* Leaders are role models for others. They are viewed as the example and must maintain standards and provide examples of effective behaviors. When Army leaders model the Army Values, they provide tangible evidence of desired behaviors and reinforce verbal guidance by demonstrating commitment and action.

(4) *Communicates.* Leaders communicate by expressing ideas and actively listening to others. Effective leaders understand the nature and power of communication, practice effective communication techniques so they can better relate to others, and translate goals into actions. **Communication is essential to all other**

leadership competencies.

TABLE

In a handwritten instruction on the AR 15-6 report, NETCOM Chief of Staff COL [REDACTED] directed Fort Detrick Signal Corps to conduct communications training. It never happened to my knowledge and no behaviors changed.

(5) Creates a positive environment/fosters de corps. Leaders are responsible for establishing and maintaining positive expectations and attitudes, which produces the setting for positive attitudes and effective work behaviors.

(6) Prepares self. Leaders are prepared to execute their leadership responsibilities fully. They are aware of their limitations and strengths and seek to develop and improve their knowledge. Only through preparation for missions and other challenges, awareness of self and situations, and the practice of lifelong learning and development can individuals fulfill the responsibilities of leadership.

(7) Develops others. Leaders develop and cultivate the lifelong learning of subordinates and teams to facilitate the achievement of organizational goals. Leaders prepare others to assume positions within the organization, ensuring a more versatile and productive organization.

(8) Gets results. Leaders provide guidance and manage resources and the work environment, thereby ensuring consistent and ethical task accomplishment.

The Detrick Earth Station component of the Washington-Moscow Hotline has likely met the definition of "NOT AUTHORIZED TO OPERATE" for over six years. That's a result.

(9) Stewards the profession. Leaders steward the profession to maintain professional standards and effective capabilities.

(10) Builds trust. Leaders establish conditions of effective influence and create a positive environment.

c. Attributes are desired internal characteristics of a leader – what the Army expects leaders to be and know.

The Army has identified three categories of key leader attributes that leaders are responsible for demonstrating; described in more detail in ADRP 6-22:

(1) *Character*. Comprised of a person's moral and ethical qualities, a leader's character helps determine what is right and gives leaders motivation to do what is appropriate, regardless of the situation. Essential components of a leader's character are Army Values, empathy, Warrior Ethos and Service Ethos, and discipline.

(2) *Presence*. The impression a leader makes to others contributes to success in leadership and is the sum of their outward appearance, demeanor, actions, and words. Essential components of a leader's presence are military and professional bearing, fitness, confidence, and resilience.

(3) *Intellect*. Leader's intellect draws upon the mental tendencies and resources that shape conceptual abilities applied to one's duties and responsibilities. Essential components of a leader's character are mental agility, sound judgment, innovation, interpersonal tact, and expertise.

d. Army professionals are required to uphold the Army Ethic and model the core leader competencies described above. They must remain vigilant to guard against counterproductive leadership behaviors from themselves as well as in the units with which they serve. Counterproductive leadership can take different forms, from incompetence to abusiveness, all of which have detrimental impacts on individuals, the unit, and the

accomplishment of the mission. Counterproductive leadership behaviors can span a range of behaviors to include bullying, distorting information, refusing to listen to subordinates, abusing authority, retaliating, blaming others, poor self-control (loses temper), withholding encouragement, dishonesty, unfairness, unjustness, showing little or no respect, talking down to others, behaving erratically, and taking credit for others' work. One such type of counterproductive leadership is toxic leadership, which is defined as a combination of self-centered attitudes, motivations, and behaviors that have adverse effects on subordinates, the organization, and mission performance. To be classified as toxic, the counterproductive behaviors must be recurrent and have a deleterious impact on the organization's performance or the welfare of subordinates. An exacerbating factor may be if the behaviors demonstrate selfish reasons such as elevating one's own status, grabbing power, or otherwise obtaining personal gain. Counter-productive leadership behaviors prevent the establishment of a positive organizational climate, preclude other leaders from fulfilling their requirements, and may prevent the unit from achieving its mission. They will lead to investigations and, potentially, removal from position or other punitive actions. Army leaders are required to utilize self-awareness programs (MSAF, CDR360, and others) to ensure they receive feedback indicating whether they exhibit appropriate behaviors for an Army leader. Army leaders are required to provide performance and professional growth counseling to subordinate leaders to prevent or remedy counterproductive leadership.

I became a non-person after the DLPT-OPI/FLPP battle in June 2014. At that time, I volunteered for CLPM as I fit the AR 11-6 description for the position over all others. Eventually, after the issue was raised again in 2018 in regard to my back FLPP, a junior civilian language specialist was chosen over me for the CLPM position. His selection was "based on his military experience." I had 24 years, he had nine.

"The welfare of subordinates:" We lost five civilian SATCOM technicians. Civilian language specialists were denied foreign language proficiency pay (~\$6,000+ each). With my 42 years' experience, I would rate morale among Signal Corps civilians here as overall poor.

"They will lead to investigations:" What are we doing today?

If the Washington-Moscow Hotline Direct Communications Link has been operating when it should not have been authorized to operate under DIACAP/RMF – who was/is in charge of that? The Battalion was instructed to fix it in 2015/early 2016. It is now August 2019.

Recurrent: Six-plus years of this stuff.

e. Destructive leadership styles can compromise organizational effectiveness and discourage subordinates from continuing their Army service. In a variety of ways, they undermine mutual trust and impede mission accomplishment. In senior leaders, destructive styles are particularly damaging. These types of leaders must be developed to change their destructive leadership style if possible or, if not able to change, be removed from the Army profession. Five destructive leadership styles are:

(1) *Incompetent managers.* They possess inadequate cognitive or emotional fitness or have inadequate prior experience to function at their level. They cannot move from the tactical to the strategic level when so required. They cannot make sound decisions on time. Affable non-participant. These leaders are interpersonally skilled, and intellectually sound, but incapable of taking charge, making decisions, providing timely guidance, and holding subordinates accountable. They provide minimal guidance, avoid decisions, are fond of committees, meetings, visitors, and often lack passion or creativity.

I could go on...

██████████ R CIV USARMY ARCYBER (USA)

TABG

From: ██████████ CIV USARMY 21 SIG BDE (USA)
Sent: Thursday, September 5, 2019 9:14 AM
To: ██████████ CIV USARMY ARCYBER (USA)
Subject: CCB Meeting 4-5 September 2019

Ms. ██████████

I was very disappointed to hear you were unable to attend the Configuration Control Board meeting as an observer yesterday. I hope you are there today.

I was told the CCB discussions included "Nothing about the past other than we need to keep the CCB alive and the entire community informed."

Mr. ██████████ attended, but Mr. ██████████ sent his deputy (I have no idea who that is). I imagine the majority of attendees are new to the task and new to Detrick Earth Station.

The CCB appears to be on the path toward "We held a CCB; block checked; no further action required."

The CCB lack of knowledge of the true conditions at Detrick Earth Station is a key reason we are where we are today.

The CCB should know that DES is de facto not authorized to operate under RMF. The station's current minimum manning is zero, while the "active" IA Plan requires 24/7 staffing.

The CCB should know the station has been designated Mission Essential instead of Mission Critical. The attendees should all concur with the Mission Essential designation.

The station has been reconfigured for remote operation without CCB concurrence and without RMF compliance, despite the Battalion being instructed to take action by NETCOM in late 2015/early 2016.

Under the "current" IA Plan, the station has been in de facto HAZCON since September 2015.

The US has installed, without RMF oversight, Russian Federation-connected computers in a SECRET-level US facility that supports, at a minimum, the National Airborne Operations Center and Navy ships at sea. What does LTG Fogarty think of that? I worked military intelligence against the Soviets/Russians for 35 years and I strongly advise against it. Future technologies are the threat -- and the US built an isolated facility (DES) specifically to house those Russian computers.

That solution was approved and advanced by the Secretary of the Army in late 2012 during the conversion to Army civilian staffing.

No one is held accountable and the same individuals who got us where we are continue to lead the mission. NETCOM already agreed with me and instructed the Battalion to take action. The Battalion chose not to act. Who was in charge?

Please provide me with the name of the individual who appointed you to conduct the AR 15-6 investigation and/or your POC at the Office of the Secretary of Defense.


We all need to work together on this unpleasant, but mission-critical task. History will judge.

Hope this helps,


Senior Shift Language Specialist
Detrick Earth Station

TAB D

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT


The Privacy Act of 1974 prohibits any department or agency of the Federal Government from releasing and personal information about an individual without that individual's written permission.

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
U.S. ARMY CYBER COMMAND
8825 BEULAH STREET
FORT BELVOIR, VIRGINIA 22060-5246

ARCC-OPF

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Whistleblower Investigation Concerning Office of Special Counsel (OSC) Referral DI-17-2168, Department of the Army (Army) 1st Personnel Command, Washington-Moscow Direct Communications Link (DCL), Detrick Earth Station, Fort Detrick, Maryland

1. On 21 August 2019 I conducted a telephonic interview with Mr. [REDACTED], DISA IE, Director, National Senior Leader Communications Division. I advised him that I am the assigned investigating officer conducting an inquiry in to the alleged conduct that may constitute a violation of law, rule, or regulation, gross mismanagement, and substantial and specific danger to public safety. I read the privacy statement and reiterated at the end of our interview that these proceedings were to remain undisclosed. As such, the following allegations were investigated.
2. Pertaining to allegation 1 - why, despite the requirement for a Configurations Control Board (CCB) in the 2008 Information Plan for the C-Band Satellite Transmit and Receive Systems Direct Communications Link Earth Station Mr. [REDACTED] is aware of the requirement that a CCB for the DE and acknowledged that a CCB should be convened. However, the responsibility for the CCB belongs to the HQDA CIO/G6.
3. Pertaining to allegation 2 - why, since the 2015 reorganization and consolidation of Detrick Earth Station, has there not been a full review the Information Assurance Plan (IAP) under the Risk Management Framework established in 2014, Mr. [REDACTED] was unable to provide verification that IAP has not been maintained for this system.
4. Pertaining to allegation 3 - why have there been security and operational deficiencies attributable to remote operations persist at the Detrick Earth Station, including poor security monitoring, that have left the facility vulnerable, Mr. [REDACTED] indicated that the remote operations of the DES does not create a security risk. In fact, he informed that DOD has installed an unmanned Foreign Equipment Shelter (FES) behind the DES building. This shelter will provide critical communications support to our foreign partners.
5. Pertaining to allegation 4 - whether the lack of a fire suppression system required by the Information Assurance Plan and a lack of 24/7 personnel presence has led to

ARCC-OPF

SUBJECT: SUBJECT: Whistleblower Investigation Concerning Office of Special Counsel (OSC) Referral DI-17-2168, Department of the Army (Army) 1st Personnel Command, Washington-Moscow Direct Communications Link (DCL), Detrick Earth Station, Fort Detrick, Maryland

security and operational deficiencies, Mr. [REDACTED] was unable to confirm rather the lack of 24/7 manning has contributed to any security or operational deficiencies. He did confirm that a fire suppression system is a requirement for all earth stations regardless of when it was built (see enclosed email). Mr. [REDACTED] provided a copy of the DOD Building Codes for review (Tab H).

6. I concluded my interview with Mr. [REDACTED] at 0810 hours on 28 August 2019.

7. POC for this memorandum is the undersigned at 703-706-2558 or [REDACTED] [civ@mail.mil](mailto:[REDACTED]civ@mail.mil).

[REDACTED]

GS 15
Investigating Officer

TAB H

[REDACTED] CIV USARMY ARCYBER (USA)

om: [REDACTED] J CIV DISA IE (USA)
Sent: Wednesday, August 28, 2019 2:43 PM
To: [REDACTED] CIV USARMY ARCYBER (USA)
Subject: RE: Signed CCB Charter
Signed By: [REDACTED].civ@mail.mil

I will ask

V/r

[REDACTED]
Chief, Senior National Leadership Communications Division (OPC/IE/IES)
Ofc: (301) 225-4751/4800
ECVoIP 3023754575
Mobile: (703) 216-9077
Email: [REDACTED].civ@mail.mil
SIPR: [REDACTED].civ@mail.smil.mil

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] R CIV USARMY ARCYBER (USA) <[REDACTED].civ@mail.mil>
Sent: Wednesday, August 28, 2019 2:31 PM
To: [REDACTED] J CIV DISA IE (USA) <[REDACTED].civ@mail.mil>
Subject: Re: Signed CCB Charter

Thank you [REDACTED]. Is this stated somewhere in a regulation?
R/ [REDACTED]

Sent from my iPhone

> On Aug 28, 2019, at 1:24 PM, [REDACTED] J CIV DISA IE (USA) <[REDACTED].civ@mail.mil> wrote:

>

> [REDACTED]

>

> I spoke with our SATCOM division concerning the fire suppression system. I was informed that it is a requirement for all earth station regardless of when it was built. They also advised that Ft. Belvoir does have a system in place.

>

> V/r

>

> [REDACTED]

> Chief, Senior National Leadership Communications Division (OPC/IE/IES)

> Ofc: (301) 225-4751/4800

> ECVoIP 3023754575

> Mobile: (703) 216-9077

> Email: [REDACTED].civ@mail.mil

> SIPR: [REDACTED].civ@mail.smil.mil

>

>

> -----Original Message-----

> From: [REDACTED] J CIV DISA IE (USA)

> Sent: Wednesday, August 28, 2019 8:00 AM

> To: [REDACTED] CIV USARMY ARCYBER (USA) <[REDACTED].civ@mail.mil>

> Subject: Signed CCB Charter

>

>

>

> V/r

>

> [REDACTED]

> Chief, Senior National Leadership Communications Division (OPC/IE/IES)

> Ofc: (301) 225-4751/4800

> ECVoIP 3023754575

> Mobile: (703) 216-9077

> Email: [REDACTED]@mail.mil

> SIPR: [REDACTED].civ@mail.smil.mil

>

>

TAB 4

UFC 1-200-01
20 June 2016

UNIFIED FACILITIES CRITERIA (UFC)

DoD BUILDING CODE (GENERAL BUILDING REQUIREMENTS)



APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED

UNIFIED FACILITIES CRITERIA (UFC)

DoD BUILDING CODE (GENERAL BUILDING REQUIREMENTS)

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Use of the copyrighted material apart from this UFC must have the permission of the
copyright holder.

U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS

NAVAL FACILITIES ENGINEERING COMMAND (Preparing Activity)

AIR FORCE CIVIL ENGINEER CENTER

Record of Changes (changes are indicated by \1\ ... /1/)

| Change No. | Date | Location |
|------------|------|----------|
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |

This UFC supersedes UFC 1-200-01, dated 1 July 2013, including change 3,
implemented 1 August 2015.

FOREWORD

The Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) system is prescribed by MIL-STD 3007 and provides planning, design, construction, sustainment, restoration, and modernization criteria, and applies to the Military Departments, the Defense Agencies, and the DoD Field Activities in accordance with USD (AT&L) Memorandum dated 29 May 2002. UFC will be used for all DoD projects and work for other customers where appropriate. All construction outside of the United States is also governed by Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA), Host Nation Funded Construction Agreements (HNFA), and in some instances, Bilateral Infrastructure Agreements (BIA.) Therefore, the acquisition team must ensure compliance with the most stringent of the UFC, the SOFA, the HNFA, and the BIA, as applicable.


UFC are living documents and will be periodically reviewed, updated, and made available to users as part of the Services' responsibility for providing technical criteria for military construction. Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (HQUSACE), Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC), and Air Force Civil Engineer Center (AFCEC) are responsible for administration of the UFC system. Defense agencies should contact the preparing service for document interpretation and improvements. Technical content of UFC is the responsibility of the cognizant DoD working group. Recommended changes with supporting rationale should be sent to the respective service proponent office by the following electronic form: Criteria Change Request. The form is also accessible from the Internet sites listed below.

UFC are effective upon issuance and are distributed only in electronic media from the following source:


- Whole Building Design Guide web site <http://dod.wbdg.org/>.

Hard copies of UFC printed from electronic media should be checked against the current electronic version prior to use to ensure that they are current.

AUTHORIZED BY:




JAMES C. DALTON, P.E.
Chief, Engineering and Construction
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers



JOSEPH E. GOTT, P.E.
Chief Engineer
Naval Facilities Engineering Command



EDWIN H. OSHIBA, SES, DAF
Deputy Director of Civil Engineers
DCS/Logistics, Engineering &
Force Protection



MICHAEL McANDREW
DASD (Facilities Investment and Management)
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Energy, Installations, and Environment)

UFC 1-200-01
20 June 2016

**UNIFIED FACILITIES CRITERIA (UFC)
SUMMARY SHEET**

Document: UFC 1-200-01, *DoD BUILDING CODE (GENERAL BUILDING REQUIREMENTS)*, dated 1 April 2016.

Superseding: UFC 1-200-01, GENERAL BUILDING REQUIREMENTS, dated 1 July 2013 with Change 3 dated 1 August 2015.

Description: This update to UFC 1-200-01 represents the Tri-Services effort to bring uniformity to the military use of non-government model building codes. Technical representatives of each of the four Services developed requirements in this document to implement the use of the 2015 International Building Code (IBC) consistent with the scope of current military requirements and procedures. This revision of UFC 1-200-01 contains modifications in the following areas:

- DoD criteria guidance approved as late as 6 October 2015 has been cited.

Reasons for Document: The existing guidance was inadequate for the following reasons:

- This document replaces the 2012 IBC with the use of the 2015 IBC revised and replaced in 2015 by the International Code Council.

Impact: The following direct benefits will result from the update of UFC 1-200-01:

- Creation of a single source reference for the latest building code.
- This document reduces interpretation and ambiguity that could lead to design and construction conflicts.
- Costs of DoD facilities are not expected to increase as a result of this revision.

Non-Unified Items: This document contains no non-unified items.

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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

1-1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE.

This UFC provides general building requirements, establishes the use of consensus building codes and standards, identifies key core UFC, and identifies unique military criteria.

1-2 APPLICABILITY.

This UFC applies to the design and construction of new and renovated Government-owned facilities for the Department of Defense (DoD). It is applicable to all methods of project delivery and levels of construction as defined below. For facilities supporting military operations refer to Paragraph 1-7 of this UFC.

1-3 LEVELS OF CONSTRUCTION.

1-3.1 Permanent Construction.

Buildings and facilities designed and constructed to serve a life expectancy of more than 25 years.

1-3.2 Semi-permanent Construction.

Buildings and facilities designed and constructed to serve a life expectancy of more than 5 years, but less than 25 years. This construction level is typically only used for support of military operations. Expediency of construction and material availability may be a factor. Facilities are intended to have a more enduring presence with operational characteristics and functional performance similar to permanent construction. Maintainability of finishes and systems must be commensurate with facility life expectancy and available maintenance capabilities. A moderate level of energy and water efficiency must be considered.

1-3.3 Temporary Construction.

Buildings and facilities designed and constructed to serve a life expectancy of five years or less using low cost construction. Temporary construction typically cannot be economically converted to a higher level of construction. Temporary facilities have limited flexibility for conversion and re-use.

1-4 BUILDING CODES AND MILITARY MODIFICATIONS.

1-4.1 Building Codes.

Use the 2015 International Building Code (IBC) and the 2015 International Existing Building Code (IEBC) as follows:

- Use the IBC, including all published errata, as the building code for the Department of Defense, except as modified by this UFC. Where a paragraph in any chapter of the IBC references a paragraph in a different chapter, the referenced chapter shall be modified as described in Chapter 2 of this UFC.
- Use the IEBC, including all published errata, except as modified by this UFC. Where a paragraph in any chapter of the IEBC references a paragraph in a different chapter, the referenced chapter shall be modified as described in Chapter 4 of this UFC.

The IBC and IEBC have been modified in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 of this UFC through reference to core UFC, other UFC as identified in Appendix A, *References*, and other listed military criteria. Core UFC provide the unique military building criteria that parallel the building code and apply to building systems found in most DoD facilities. In conflicts between the IBC and military criteria, or between the IEBC and military criteria, use the military criteria.

1-4.2 Referenced Codes and Substitutions.

References in this code to other codes must be treated as follows:

- All references to the International Fuel Gas Code (IFGC) must be considered to be references to NFPA 54 (ANSI Z223.1) and NFPA 58.
- All references to the International Mechanical Code (IMC) must be considered to be references to UFC 3-410-01, which cites the IMC.
- All references to the International Plumbing Code (IPC) must be considered to be references to UFC 3-420-01, which cites the IPC.
- The International Property Maintenance Code (IPMC) is not adopted.
- All references to the International Fire Code (IFC) must be considered to be references to UFC 3-600-01, which cites NFPA 1.
- All references to the International Energy Conservation Code (IECC) must be considered to be references to UFC 1-200-02, which cites ASHRAE 90.1 and ASHRAE 189.1.
- All references to NFPA 70 must be considered to be references to UFC 3-501-01, which cites NFPA 70.

- All references to the International Residential Code (IRC) must be considered to be references to UFC 3-600-01, which cites the IRC, with the exception of citing NFPA 101 for egress and fire protection requirements.

1-5 IMPLEMENTATION, ADMINISTRATION, AND ENFORCEMENT.

UFC are effective upon issuance for projects as follows:

- Design-Bid-Build projects that have not proceeded beyond 35% design completion.
- Design-Build projects that have not proceeded beyond date of RFP issuance. When an RFP is issued in multiple phases or steps, use the date of the last phase of the RFP issuance.
- Projects that have a delay, either planned or unintentional, of more than 18 months between design completion and the solicitation of offers for construction, must be re-evaluated to determine if any design revision is necessary due to changes in criteria (including codes and standards) or site infrastructure (e.g., water supply for fire department vehicle access).
Note: The evaluation must also include retroactive requirements that have been included in the new editions of the criteria.

The terms "Building Official", "Code Official", and "Authority Having Jurisdiction" (AHJ) as used in the codes and standards referenced in this UFC mean the component office of responsibility, i.e., U.S. Army, HQ USACE/CECW-CE; U.S. Navy, NAVFACENGCOM HQ Code CHE; U.S. Marine Corps, HQMC Code LFF-1; and U.S. Air Force, AFCEC. The enforcement of the codes and standards as they pertain to facility projects can be delegated to the local Components Office's Chief Engineer's Technical Representative at the discretion of the components aforementioned office.

1-6 UFC HIERARCHY.

UFC 1-200-01 is the overarching document for buildings and facilities used by DoD. UFC 1-200-01 directs the use of the IBC, the IEBC, Core UFC, other UFC as applicable to the building, facility, structure, or system being designed, and FCs as they pertain to the applicable DoD Component.

- If conflict occurs between UFC 1-200-01 and UFC 3-600-01, the requirements of UFC 3-600-01 take precedence.

The UFC 3- Series provides discipline specific requirements for the various engineering disciplines.

- If conflict occurs between a UFC 3- Series and UFC 3-600-01, the requirements of UFC 3-600-01 take precedence.
- If conflict occurs between two UFC within the UFC 3- Series, the requirements of the UFC that is more detailed pertaining to that specific building, facility, structure, or system take precedence.

The UFC 4- Series and FC 4- Series (simply referred to as UFC 4- Series) provide specific requirements for a particular building, facility, structure, or system.

- If conflict occurs between a UFC 4- Series and UFC 3-600-01, the requirements of UFC 4- Series take precedence.
- If conflict occurs between a UFC 4- Series and a UFC 3- Series, the requirements of the UFC 4- Series take precedence.

1-7 FACILITIES IN SUPPORT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS.

The following UFC are primarily intended for use outside of the United States and its territories and possessions. Also, Joint Publication 3.0, *Joint Operations*, provides typical examples of military operations where uses of these UFC are appropriate.

1-7.1 UFC 1-201-01.

Use UFC 1-201-01 for design of non-permanent facilities constructed for use by DoD personnel in support of military operations.

1-7.2 UFC 1-201-02.

Use UFC 1-201-02 to assess existing facilities for life safety and habitability for use by DoD personnel in support of military operations.

1-7.3 UFC 1-202-01.

Use UFC 1-202-01 for design of host nation facilities that support military operations.

1-8 REFERENCES AND DATES OF PUBLICATION.

Appendix A contains a list of references used in this document. The publication date of the code or standard is not included in this document, except for the International family of codes as referenced within the document and in Appendix A. In general, the latest available issuance of the reference is used.

CHAPTER 2 MODIFICATIONS TO THE INTERNATIONAL BUILDING CODE (IBC)

2-1 CHAPTER 1 – SCOPE AND ADMINISTRATION.

Use IBC Chapter 1, Sections **101 GENERAL**, **102 APPLICABILITY**, **110 INSPECTIONS**, and **112 SERVICE UTILITIES** as modified below. Do not use other sections in IBC Chapter 1. Modify IBC Chapter 1 as follows:

- Delete IBC Section **101.1 Title**, and replace with the following:

101.1 Title. These regulations shall be known as the DoD Building Code, hereinafter referred to as “this code”.

- Delete IBC Section **101.4.4 Property maintenance**.
- Delete IBC Section **102.1 General**, and replace with the following:

102.1 General. Where there is a conflict between a general requirement and a specific requirement, the specific requirement shall be applicable. Where, in any specific case, different sections of this code specify different materials, methods of construction or other requirements, the most restrictive shall govern. Refer to Paragraph 1-6 of this UFC for hierarchy of UFC.

2-2 CHAPTER 2 – DEFINITIONS.

Use IBC Chapter 2. Definitions in IBC Chapter 2 apply to terms used in the model code and are not intended to replace definitions and terms in military documents. It is essential that the code defined meaning be known to understand the intent and correctly interpret the code.

2-3 CHAPTER 3 – USE AND OCCUPANCY CLASSIFICATION.

Use IBC Chapter 3 and UFC 3-600-01.

2-4 CHAPTER 4 – SPECIAL DETAILED REQUIREMENTS BASED ON USE AND OCCUPANCY.

Use UFC 3-600-01 in lieu of IBC Chapter 4.

2-5 CHAPTER 5 – GENERAL BUILDING HEIGHTS AND AREAS.

Use IBC Chapter 5 and UFC 3-600-01. UFC 3-600-01 gives direction concerning the requirements for fire-rated partitions. Note that the building area for funding and planning purposes is calculated differently than the method defined in IBC Chapter 5 for code compliance calculation

2-6 CHAPTER 6 – TYPES OF CONSTRUCTION.

Use IBC Chapter 6 and UFC 3-600-01.

2-7 CHAPTER 7 – FIRE AND SMOKE PROTECTION FEATURES.

Use IBC Chapter 7 and UFC 3-600-01. UFC 3-600-01 gives direction concerning the requirements for fire-rated partitions.

2-8 CHAPTER 8 – INTERIOR FINISHES.

Do not use IBC Chapter 8. Use UFC 3-600-01 in lieu of IBC Chapter 8 in conjunction and coordination with UFC 3-120-10.

2-9 CHAPTER 9 – FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS.

Do not use IBC Chapter 9. Use UFC 3-600-01 in lieu of IBC Chapter 9.

2-10 CHAPTER 10 – MEANS OF EGRESS.

Do not use IBC Chapter 10, except when referenced by US Access Board, *Architectural Barriers Act (ABA) Standards*. Use UFC 3-600-01 in lieu of IBC Chapter 10. Where the *ABA Standards* reference the previous versions of the IBC, the applicable requirements of the 2015 IBC are acceptable.

2-11 CHAPTER 11 – ACCESSIBILITY.

Do not use IBC Chapter 11. Use the *ABA Standards* and the special provisions of the Department of Defense Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum *Subject: Access for People with Disabilities*, October 31, 2008. Refer to Appendix A for a link to the *ABA Standards* and the DoD policy memorandum. Where the *ABA Standards* reference the previous versions of the IBC, the applicable requirements of the 2015 IBC are acceptable.

2-12 CHAPTER 12 – INTERIOR ENVIRONMENT.

Use IBC Chapter 12 as modified below. IBC Chapter 12 provides the minimum standards for the interior environment of a building by addressing minimum space sizes, and temperature, light, and ventilation levels for occupancy. It also addresses minimum sound transfer, addresses ventilation of attics and under floor spaces, and provides for minimum moisture resistance standards for toilets and bathrooms. Modify IBC Chapter 12 as follows:

- Delete IBC Section **1204.1 Equipment and systems**, including the exception, and replace with the following:

1204.1 Equipment and systems. Use the applicable Unified Facilities Criteria and individual military service standards for temperature control criteria.

- For Navy and Marine Corps Unaccompanied Housing facilities only, delete IBC Sections **1207.2 Air-borne sound**, **1207.3 Structure-borne sound**, **1208.3 Room area**, and **1208.4 Efficiency dwelling units**. Use FC 4-721-10N for air-borne and structure-borne sound transmission criteria, minimum room size criteria, and dwelling unit criteria. Also use UFC 3-101-01 and UFC 3-120-10.

2-13 CHAPTER 13 – ENERGY EFFICIENCY.

Do not use IBC Chapter 13. Use UFC 1-200-02 in lieu of IBC Chapter 13.

2-14 CHAPTER 14 – EXTERIOR WALLS.

Use IBC Chapter 14 as modified below. IBC Chapter 14 addresses requirements for exterior walls of buildings, provides minimum standards for wall covering materials, their installation and their ability to provide weather protection. Modify IBC Chapter 14 as follows:

- Delete IBC Section **1403.5 Vertical and lateral flame propagation**.
- Delete IBC Section **1407.10.4 Full-scale tests**, and replace with the following:

1407.10.4 Full-scale tests. The MCM system shall be tested in accordance with, and comply with, the acceptance criteria of NFPA 285. Such testing shall be performed on the MCM system with the MCM in the maximum thickness intended for use. Where noncombustible materials or combustible materials permitted by Sections 603, 1406, or UFC 3-600-01 differ from assembly to assembly or within an assembly, multiple tests shall not be required.

Exception: The MCM system is not required to be tested in accordance with, and comply with, acceptance criteria of NFPA 285 in buildings equipped throughout with an automatic sprinkler system in accordance with UFC 3-600-01.

2-15 CHAPTER 15 – ROOF ASSEMBLIES AND ROOFTOP STRUCTURES.

Use IBC Chapter 15, UFC 3-110-03, and UFC 3-600-01. IBC Chapter 15 provides standards for roof assemblies as well as rooftop structures. It also provides some requirements for fire resistance in roofing.

2-16 CHAPTER 16 – STRUCTURAL DESIGN.

Use IBC Chapter 16 as modified by UFC 3-301-01. Use IBC Chapter 16 and UFC 3-310-04 for the seismic design of buildings. IBC Chapter 16 describes minimal structural loading requirements, minimum design loads (live and dead, snow and wind, rain, flood and earthquake), as well as load combinations, and permitted design methodologies.

2-17 CHAPTER 17 – SPECIAL INSPECTIONS AND TESTS.

Use IBC Chapter 17 as modified by UFC 3-301-01, UFC 3-600-01, and below. The Structural Tests and Special inspections described in IBC Chapter 17 provide a variety of procedures and criteria for testing materials and assemblies, labeling materials and assemblies, and for some special inspection of certain structural assemblies. Some DoD requirements are more stringent and these take precedence as identified in these UFC. Modify IBC Chapter 17 as follows:

- Delete IBC Chapter 17, Section **1704.2 Special inspections and tests**, and replace with the following:
Special inspections and tests. The contractor must employ one or more *approved agencies* to perform inspections during construction on the types of work listed under Section 1705. These inspections are in addition to the inspections defined in Section 110. The inspecting agency must provide reports of the special inspections directly to the government.

2-18 CHAPTER 18 – SOILS AND FOUNDATIONS.

Use IBC Chapter 18 as modified by UFC 3-220-01, UFC 3-201-01, UFC 3-301-01, and below. Modify IBC Chapter 18 as follows:

- Supplement to IBC Section **1804.4 Site grading**: Ensure that the grading and associated storm water runoff do not adversely affect surrounding sites. Establish finished floor elevations a minimum of 6 inches (150 mm) above finished grade at the perimeter of the building and provide site grading in accordance with UFC 3-201-01.
- Delete the exception to IBC Section **1804.4 Site grading**.
- Supplement to IBC Section **1808.7.4 Foundation elevation**: Establish finished floor elevations a minimum of 6 inches (150 mm) above finished grade at the perimeter of the building and provide site grading in accordance with UFC 3-201-01.

2-19 CHAPTER 19 – CONCRETE.

Use IBC Chapter 19 as modified by UFC 3-301-01 and UFC 1-200-02. IBC Chapter 19 provides only minimum accepted practices for the use of plain concrete and reinforced concrete in construction.

2-20 CHAPTER 20 – ALUMINUM.

Use IBC Chapter 20. IBC Chapter 20 contains standards for the use of aluminum; however, only the structural applications of aluminum are addressed. IBC Chapter 20 does not address the use of aluminum in specialty products such as window framing or architectural hardware. For aluminum use in Heating, Ventilation, Air Conditioning (HVAC) systems, use UFC 3-410-01.

2-21 CHAPTER 21 – MASONRY.

Use IBC Chapter 21 as modified by UFC 3-301-01. IBC Chapter 21 addresses comprehensive and practical requirements for masonry, including material specifications, test methods, types of wall construction, and criteria for empirical and engineered designs. Masonry foundations are also addressed in IBC Chapter 18 as modified by Paragraph 2-18 of this UFC.

2-22 CHAPTER 22 – STEEL.

Use IBC Chapter 22 as modified by UFC 3-301-01. IBC Chapter 22 provides the minimum commercial requirements for the design and construction of structural steel, including composite construction, cold-formed steel, steel joists, steel cable structures, and steel storage racks. Steel for structures is generally classified as Type I and Type II construction; however steel is permitted in all types of construction.

2-23 CHAPTER 23 – WOOD.

Use IBC Chapter 23, UFC 3-301-01, and UFC 3-600-01. IBC Chapter 23 provides minimum requirements for the design of buildings and structures that use wood and wood based products in framing and fabrication. In general, only buildings of Type III, Type IV, or Type V construction may be constructed of wood.

2-24 CHAPTER 24 – GLASS AND GLAZING.

Use IBC Chapter 24 as modified by UFC 4-010-01. IBC Chapter 24 establishes regulations for glass and glazing that when properly installed, are able to meet required resistance to wind, snow, and dead loads. The engineering and design requirements are included in the chapter.

2-25 CHAPTER 25 – GYPSUM BOARD, GYPSUM PANEL PRODUCTS AND PLASTER.

Use IBC Chapter 25. IBC Chapter 25 contains the provisions and referenced standards that regulate the design, construction and quality of gypsum board and plaster. They represent the most common interior and exterior finish materials in the commercial building industry and the DoD. IBC Chapter 25 addresses quality control issues, material specifications, and installation requirements, under the control of industry requirements. However, it is the responsibility of the AHJ to inspect and ensure that the appropriate products are used and properly installed for the intended use and location.

2-26 CHAPTER 26 – PLASTIC.

Use IBC Chapter 26 and UFC 3-600-01, as modified below. IBC Chapter 26 addresses the use of plastics in building construction and components for flammable materials such as foam plastic insulation, foam plastics used as exterior and interior trim, and other plastic veneers such as fiberglass reinforced polymers which may be quite flammable and create toxic smoke. The requirements and limitations in UFC 3-600-01 are necessary to control the use of plastic and foam plastic products such that they do not compromise the safety of the building occupants or mission. Modify IBC Chapter 26 as follows:

- Delete IBC Section **2603.5.5 Vertical and lateral fire propagation**, including the exceptions, and replace with the following:

2603.5.5 Vertical and lateral fire propagation. Exterior wall assemblies shall be tested in accordance with, and comply with, acceptance criteria of NFPA 285. Where noncombustible materials or combustible materials permitted by Sections 603, 1406, or UFC 3-600-01 differ from assembly to assembly or within an assembly, multiple tests shall not be required.

Exceptions: Exterior wall assemblies are not required to be tested in accordance with, and comply with, acceptance criteria of NFPA 285 where any of the following conditions are met:

1. One-story buildings complying with Section 2603.4.1.4.
2. Wall assemblies where the foam plastic insulation is covered on each face by a minimum of 1-inch (25 mm) thickness of masonry or concrete complying with either of the following:
 - 2.1. There is no air space between the insulation and the concrete or masonry; or
 - 2.2. The insulation has a flame spread index of not more than 25 as determined in accordance with ASTM E 84 or UL 723 and the maximum air space between the insulation and the concrete or masonry is not more than 1 inch (25 mm).
3. Buildings equipped throughout with an automatic sprinkler system in accordance with UFC 3-600-01.

2-27 CHAPTER 27 – ELECTRICAL.

Use IBC Chapter 27 as modified below. The IBC references NFPA 70, National Electrical Code (NEC). In addition, IBC Chapter 27, Section **2702 EMERGENCY AND STANDBY POWER SYSTEMS**, which addresses emergency and standby power requirements, references the IFC.. Instead of the IFC, use UFC 3-600-01, which cites NFPA 1. Modify IBC Chapter 27 as follows:

- Use UFC 3-501-01 for general electrical requirement criteria.

- Use UFC 3-520-01 for interior electrical systems criteria.
- Use UFC 3-530-01 for interior and exterior lighting and controls criteria.
- Use UFC 3-540-01 for engine-driven generator criteria.
- Use UFC 3-550-01 for exterior power distribution systems criteria.
- Use UFC 3-560-01 for electrical safety and electrical Operations and Maintenance (O&M) criteria.
- Use UFC 3-580-01 for building telecommunications criteria.
- Use UFC 3-600-01 for fire protection criteria.
- Use UFC 4-021-01 for mass notification systems criteria.

2-28 CHAPTER 28 – MECHANICAL SYSTEMS.

Use IBC Chapter 28 as modified by UFC 3-401-01. Use UFC 3-600-01 for Fire Protection features for mechanical systems. IBC Chapter 28 provides references to the IMC which has been modified by UFC 3-410-01. However, the International Fuel Gas Code has not been adopted. The DoD uses NFPA 54 (ANSI Z223.1), National Fuel Gas Code, for the design and installation of fuel gas piping systems.

2-29 CHAPTER 29 – PLUMBING SYSTEMS.

Use IBC Chapter 29 as modified by UFC 3-420-01. IBC Chapter 29 regulates the number of plumbing fixtures that must be provided for each type of building and number of occupants, and it regulates gender separations except for certain types of small buildings.

2-30 CHAPTER 30 – ELEVATORS AND CONVEYING SYSTEMS.

Use IBC Chapter 30 and UFC 3-600-01. For Army and Navy projects, also use ITG FY13-0. If conflict occurs between IBC Chapter 30 and ITG FY13-01, the requirements of ITG FY13-01 take precedence. If conflict occurs between UFC 3-600-01 and ITG FY13-01, the requirements of UFC 3-600-01 take precedence.

2-31 CHAPTER 31 – SPECIAL CONSTRUCTION.

Use IBC Chapter 31. IBC Chapter 31 includes criteria for special building construction, including membrane structures, temporary structures, pedestrian walkways and tunnels, awnings and canopies, marquees, signs, towers and antennas, and automatic vehicular gates.

2-32 CHAPTER 32 – ENCROACHMENTS INTO THE PUBLIC RIGHT-OF-WAY.

Use IBC Chapter 32. Buildings and structures from time to time are designed to extend over a property line or into the public right of way. Local regulations outside the building usually set limits to such encroachments, and government criteria may perform the same function in various locations. Such military criteria should always take precedence over provisions of IBC Chapter 32.

2-33 CHAPTER 33 – SAFEGUARDS DURING CONSTRUCTION.

Use IBC Chapter 33 and UFC 3-600-01. IBC Chapter 33 provides safety requirements during construction and demolition of buildings and structures.

2-34 CHAPTER 34 – RESERVED.

Not used.

2-35 CHAPTER 35 – REFERENCED STANDARDS.

Use IBC Chapter 35. IBC Chapter 35 contains numerous references to standards that are used to regulate materials and methods of construction. It contains a comprehensive list of all standards that are referenced in the IBC. Also refer to IBC Section **102.4 Referenced codes and standards**, and Paragraph 1-4.2 of this UFC for a detailed explanation of the applicability of referenced codes and standards.

2-36 APPENDICES.

Do not use IBC Appendices A through Appendix M.

CHAPTER 3 OTHER CRITERIA

3-1 GENERAL.

In addition to the International Building Code as modified in Chapter 2 of this UFC, and the IEBC as modified in Chapter 4 of this UFC, comply with the following criteria in this chapter.

3-2 HIGHER AUTHORITY MANDATES.

Design and Construction must be in compliance with Public Laws (P.L.), Executive Orders (E.O.), Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Department of Defense Instructions (DoDI), Department of Defense Manuals (DoDM), and Department of Defense Directives (DoDD) or other higher authority documents as applicable, as listed in MIL-STD-3007F, Appendix B.

3-2.1 Vending Facilities for the Blind.

Verify with the using activity the requirement to provide blind-operated vending facilities in compliance with the Randolph-Sheppard Act and DoDI 1125.03. This requirement generally applies in buildings that are over 1,400 SM (15,000 SF) that will contain over 100 employees, but may also apply in other situations at the discretion of the using activity.

3-2.2 Nursing Mothers in Federal Employment.

For facilities that are places of employment, provide a private space for nursing mothers as recommended by OPM Memorandum for Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, as detailed in the Guide for Establishing a Federal Nursing Mother's Program. This space may not be a bathroom, and must be shielded from view and free from intrusion of others. A nursing mother's space must be functional, with a private space with a place to sit and a flat surface, other than the floor, to place the breast pump and other supplies. Although there are no size or permanency requirements, this space must provide access to electricity for the use of a breast pump, as well as good lighting, a comfortable temperature, and proper ventilation; and be near a source of hot and cold running water. In addition, comply with any command-specific policy applicable to this requirement or applicable to the establishment of a working mothers program within the facility.

3-3 UNIFIED FACILITY CRITERIA (UFC).

Comply with the UFC (latest version, refer to Paragraph 1-5 of this UFC) as noted herein.

3-3.1 Core UFC.

Core UFC are criteria that provide requirements for the majority of traditional building systems that are prevalent on DoD facility construction projects. Core UFC also identify additional criteria such as Antiterrorism, High Performance, and Sustainable Building requirements mandated by law and policy. Comply with the Core UFC listed here, and other UFC identified in Appendix A as they are applicable.

- 1-200-02, High Performance and Sustainable Building Requirements
- 3-101-01, Architecture
- 3-110-03, Roofing
- 3-120-10, Interior Design
- 3-201-01, Civil Engineering
- 3-201-02, Landscape Architecture
- 3-210-10, Low Impact Development
- 3-220-01, Geotechnical Engineering
- 3-230-01, Water Storage, Distribution, and Transmission
- 3-230-03, Water Treatment
- 3-240-01, Wastewater Collection
- 3-301-01, Structural Engineering
- 3-310-04, Seismic Design for Buildings
- 3-401-01, Mechanical Engineering
- 3-410-01, Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning
- 3-420-01, Plumbing Systems
- 3-501-01, Electrical Engineering
- 3-520-01, Interior Electrical Systems
- 3-530-01, Interior and Exterior Lighting Systems and Controls
- 3-540-01, Engine-Driven Generator Systems for Backup Power Applications
- 3-550-01, Exterior Electrical Power Distribution
- 3-560-01, Electrical Safety, O&M
- 3-580-01, Telecommunications Building Cabling Systems Planning and Design
- 3-600-01, Fire Protection Engineering for Facilities
- 4-010-01, DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings

- 4-010-02, DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standoff Distances for Buildings (FOUO)
- 4-021-01, Design and O&M: Mass Notification Systems

3-3.2 Other UFC.

In addition to the "Core UFC", comply with other UFC as applicable to the system, structure, or facility type defined in the scope of the construction project.

3-4 FACILITY CRITERIA (FC).

The designation, "Facility Criteria (FC)" has been adopted for criteria that are not applicable to all DoD Components. For example: FC 4-721-10N "Navy and Marine Corps Unaccompanied Housing" has a final "N" designation because it is used by the Navy, including its Component, the U.S. Marine Corps. FC provide functional requirements (i.e., defined in more detail by the users and operational needs of a particular facility type). Differences in functional requirements between DoD Components may exist due to differences in their policies and more specific operational needs. FC are applicable only to the DoD Component(s) indicated in the title, and are intended for use with unified technical requirements published in UFC. Comply with the FC for the designated facility type and the DoD Component.

3-5 SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.

Use Unified Facilities Guide Specifications (UFGS) for all projects, including Design-Build submittals, and in accordance with UFC 1-300-02. Download, use, and edit the most current UFGS database available from the Whole Building Design Guide website at http://www.wbdg.org/ccb/browse_cat.php?c=3. Modify and edit the UFGS as necessary to suit the work required by the specific project, including editing for metric or inch-pound and to reflect the latest proven technology, materials, and methods for the project. Follow Order of Precedence requirements for each Government Design Agent on use of Regional, Agency, Unified, and Other guide specifications. Other guide specifications are only allowed as a basis for information when not available in the UFGS. These developed specifications must be provided in UFGS format and modified to meet the requirements of UFC 1-300-02.

3-6 OTHER MILITARY CRITERIA.

Military criteria other than those listed in this UFC may be applicable to specific types of structures, building systems, or building occupancies. Such structures, systems, or buildings must meet the additional requirements of applicable military criteria.

3-6.1 Explosive Safety.

This document does not contain requirements for explosives safety. Facilities that involve DoD Ammunition and Explosives (AE) storage, handling, maintenance, manufacture or disposal, as well as facilities within the explosives safety quantity distance (ESQD) arcs of AE facilities, must comply with the requirements found in DoD 6055.09-M, as well as implementing Service criteria found in DA PAM 385-64 (Army), NAVSEA OP 5 (Navy and Marine Corps), and AFMAN 91-201 (Air Force). DoD facilities exposed to potential explosion effects from AE belonging to other nations are also required to meet DoD and Service explosives safety criteria.

- It is essential that the planning and design of new facilities, and occupation and renovation of existing AE-related facilities, or other facilities within ESQD arcs be accomplished in close coordination with knowledgeable explosives safety professionals in theater, or with the Services' Explosives Safety Centers. This coordination should occur as early as possible in the planning and design process to avoid issues or problems and to ensure compliance.
- Facility construction or use within ESQD arcs requires review for compliance with explosives safety criteria, and must have either an approved explosives safety site plan or an approved explosives safety deviation. Refer to the DoD Service documents mentioned above for further applicable guidance.

3-6.2 Facility Systems Safety.

Safety is an important component of maintaining and operating DoD facilities, and must be considered during design. Incorporate a hazards review into the regular design review process to ensure systems safety has been considered at the earliest phases of project development to reduce and mitigate unintentional maintenance and operational hazards. Army projects will incorporate the safety engineering practices delineated under the Facilities Systems Safety (FASS) program as prescribed under AR PAM 385-16 *System Safety Management Guide* to the extent practicable and feasible. Air Force projects will incorporate the safety engineering practices delineated in Air Force Instruction (AFI) 91-203, *Air Force Consolidated Occupational Safety Instruction*, to the extent practicable and feasible.

3-6.3 Antiterrorism.

Antiterrorism is defined as defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts. UFC 4-010-01 sets the minimum requirements for DoD buildings, and the Geographic Combatant Commander Antiterrorism Construction Standards address unique requirements specific to their area of responsibility. Refer to UFC 4-010-01 and the Geographic Combatant Commander Antiterrorism Construction Standards for the minimum antiterrorism requirements.

3-6.4 Physical Security.

Physical security is defined as that part of security concerned with physical measures designed and placed to safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to installations, equipment, material and documents, to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft. Many buildings require some level of physical security. When required, integrate physical measures into the site, building, room(s), or area(s) as applicable. The DoD documents the requirements for physical security related to specific assets in DoD publications, directives, manuals, and instructions. The Services have related documents that implement the DoD policy for the Services. The main DoD documents that contain the physical security requirements for the protection of specific DoD assets are shown in Table 3-1. This does not include the policy documents associated with the protection of nuclear and chemical assets.

Table 3-1 Policy Related to Physical Security

| Asset | Policy and Documents |
|---|---|
| Classified Information | DoDM 5200.01-R, <i>DoD Information Security Program</i> ; http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pub1.html |
| Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) | DoDM 5105.21-Volume 1, <i>Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) Administrative Security Manual: Administration of Information and Information Systems Security</i> ; http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pub1.html DoDM 5105.21-Volume 2, <i>Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) Administrative Security Manual: Administration of Physical Security, Visitor Control, and Technical Security</i> ; http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pub1.html UFC 4-010-05, <i>Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities Planning, Design, and Construction</i> . https://www.wbdg.org/ccb/DOD/UFC/ufc_4_010_05.pdf |
| Special Access Program (SAP) Information | DoDM 5205.07 Volume 3, <i>DoD Special Access Program (SAP) Security Manual: Physical Security</i> ; http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pub1.html |
| Arms, Ammunition and Explosives | DoDM 5100.76-M, <i>Physical Security of Sensitive Conventional Arms, Ammunition and Explosives (AA&E)</i> ; http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pub1.html |
| Weapons Systems and Platforms | DoD 5200.08-R, <i>Physical Security Program</i> ; http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pub1.html |
| Bulk Petroleum Products | |
| Communications Systems | |
| Controlled Inventory Items | |

3-6.5 Cybersecurity.

All control systems (including systems separate from an energy management control system) must be designed, acquired and executed in accordance with DoDI 8500.01, DoDI 8510.01, and as required by individual Service Implementation Policy.

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CHAPTER 4 MODIFICATIONS TO THE INTERNATIONAL EXISTING BUILDING CODE (IEBC)

4-1 GENERAL.

For existing structures, use IEBC as modified below. Provisions in IEBC Chapter 14 deal with alternative methods of compliance requirements when dealing with existing building constraints. This IEBC chapter allows for a controlled departure from full compliance with the technical codes, without compromising the minimum standards of life safety and fire prevention of the rehabilitated building as required in UFC 3-600-01. An example may be concerning fire escape requirements that differ in UFC 3-600-01. Modify IEBC Chapters 4 and 14 as follows:

- Use IEBC Chapter 4 with UFC 3-310-04 for seismic evaluation and seismic rehabilitation of existing buildings. If conflict occurs between IEBC Chapter 4 and UFC 3-310-04, the requirements of UFC 3-310-04 take precedence.
- Add a third paragraph to the end of IEBC Section **404.5 Flood hazard areas**, stating the following:

In addition to other requirements of this code, for renovations and alterations costing more than \$7.5 million to facilities already located within the 100-year flood plain, assess the vulnerability of mechanical and electrical subsystems to flood hazards and take necessary measures within the project to mitigate those vulnerabilities. Comply with OUSD Memorandum, Floodplain Management on Department of Defense Installations, 11 February, 2014. This policy applies only to permanent installations.
- Use IEBC Chapter 14 with UFC 3-600-01. If conflict occurs between IEBC Chapter 14 and UFC 3-600-01, the requirements of UFC 3-600-01 take precedence.
- Delete IEBC Section **1401.2 Applicability**, and replace with the following:

1401.2 Applicability. Structures existing prior to 1 April 2016, in which there is work involving additions, alterations or changes of occupancy shall be made to conform to the requirements of this chapter or the provisions of Chapter 4. The provisions of Sections 1401.2.1 through 1401.2.5 shall apply to existing occupancies that will continue to be, or are proposed to be, in Groups A, B, E, F, I-2, M, R and S. These provisions shall not apply to buildings with occupancies in Group H or I-1, I-3 or I-4.

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APPENDIX A REFERENCES

INTERNATIONAL CODE COUNCIL

<http://www.iccsafe.org>

IBC, International Building Code, 2015

ICC 300-12, Standard for Bleachers, Folding and Telescopic Seating, and Grandstands

IEBC, International Existing Building Code, 2015

IECC, International Energy Conservation Code, 2015

IMC, International Mechanical Code, 2015

IPC, International Plumbing Code, 2015

IRC, International Residential Code, 2015

NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION

<http://www.nfpa.org>

NFPA 1, Fire Code

NFPA 54 (ANSI Z223.1), National Fuel Gas Code

NFPA 58, Liquefied Petroleum Code

NFPA 70, National Electrical Code

NFPA 101, Life Safety Code

NFPA 285, Standard Fire Test Method for Evaluation of Fire Propagation
Characteristics of Exterior Non-Load-Bearing Wall Assemblies Containing
Combustible Components

UNITED STATES ACCESS BOARD

Architectural Barriers Act (ABA) Standards,

<http://www.access-board.gov/attachments/article/1029/ABAstandards.pdf>

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

<http://www.e-publishing.af.mil>

AFMAN 91-201, Explosives Safety Standards

AFI 91-203, Air Force Consolidated Occupational Safety Instruction

UNITED STATES ARMY

DA PAM 385-64, Ammunition and Explosives Standards,
http://www.apd.army.mil/pdffiles/p385_64.pdf

AR PAM 385-16, System Safety Management Guide,
http://www.apd.army.mil/pdffiles/p385_16.pdf

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Undersecretaries of Defense, Assistant Secretaries of Defense... Subject: Access for People with Disabilities October 31, 2008,
<http://www.access-board.gov/guidelines-and-standards/buildings-and-sites/about-the-aba-standards/background/dod-memorandum>

DoD 5200.08-R, Physical Security Program,
<http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pub1.html>

DoD 6055.09-M, DoD Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards,
<http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pub1.html>

DoDI 1125.03, Vending Facility Program for the Blind on DoD-Controlled Federal Property,
<http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/112503p.pdf>

DoDI 8500.01, Cybersecurity,
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/850001_2014.pdf

DoDI 8510.01, Risk Management Framework (RMF) for DoD Information Technology (IT),
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/851001_2014.pdf

DoDM 5100.76-M, Physical Security of Sensitive Conventional Arms, Ammunition and Explosives (AA&E),
<http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pub1.html>

DoDM 5200.01, DoD Information Security Program,
<http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pub1.html>

DoDM 5205.07 Volume 3, DoD Special Access Program (SAP) Security Manual: Physical Security,
<http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pub1.html>

MIL-STD-3007F, Standard Practice for Unified Facilities Criteria and Unified Facilities Guide Specifications, 13 December 2006,
<http://www.wbdg.org/ccb/FEDMIL/std3007f.pdf>

OUSD Memorandum for Assistant Secretary(s) of the Army (IE&E), Navy (EI&E), Air Force (IE&L), Directors of Defense Agencies, Directors of Defense Activities,

Director, Washington Headquarters Service. Subject: Floodplain Management on Department of Defense Installations, 11 February 2014.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, UNIFIED FACILITIES CRITERIA (UFC) / FACILITIES CRITERIA (FC)

<http://dod.wbdg.org/>

UFC 1-200-02, High Performance and Sustainable Building Requirements

UFC 1-201-01, Non-Permanent DoD Facilities in Support of Military Operations

UFC 1-201-02, Assessment of Existing Facilities for Use in Military Operations

UFC 1-202-01, Host Nation Facilities in Support of Military Operations

UFC 1-300-02, Unified Facilities Guide Specifications (UFGS) Format Standard

UFC 3-101-01, Architecture

UFC 3-110-03, Roofing

UFC 3-120-10, Interior Design

UFC 3-201-01, Civil Engineering

UFC 3-201-02, Landscape Architecture

UFC 3-210-10, Low Impact Development

UFC 3-220-01, Geotechnical Engineering

UFC 3-230-01, Water Storage, Distribution, and Transmission

UFC 3-230-03, Water Treatment

UFC 3-240-01, Wastewater Collection

UFC 3-301-01, Structural Engineering

UFC 3-310-04, Seismic Design for Buildings

UFC 3-401-01, Mechanical Engineering

UFC 3-410-01, Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning Systems

UFC 3-420-01, Plumbing Systems

UFC 3-501-01, Electrical Engineering

UFC 3-520-01, Interior Electrical Systems

UFC 3-530-01, Interior and Exterior Lighting Systems and Controls
UFC 3-540-01, Engine-Driven Generator Systems for Backup Power Applications
UFC 3-550-01, Exterior Electrical Power Distribution
UFC 3-560-01, Electrical Safety, O&M
UFC 3-580-01, Telecommunications Building Cabling Systems Planning and Design
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